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This dissertation examines the interaction between gender, the welfare state and public 
opinion in advanced democracies. My first stream of research is driven by an interest and concern 
for how family policies (re)produce gender and class inequalities, and my goal is to highlight the 
subtle incentives embedded in family policies that promote more traditional or egalitarian behaviors 
and attitudes. While some work shows that gender attitudes are becoming more traditional across 
the post-industrial world, the first chapter shows that this change is more differentiated in ways that 
are patterned by the particular configuration of family policies in a given time and place. I show that 
policies that promote women’s inclusion in the workforce are associated with egalitarian attitudes 
towards working mothers, while policies that promote familial care for children and the elderly 
promotes the diffusion of gender-essentialist beliefs about women.  
 
A second project uses panel data to examine the uneven consequences of a series of German 
family policy reforms on across educational groups, assessing to what extent these reforms 
exacerbated or alleviated educational inequalities in women’s employment patterns, earnings, and 
working hours. I show that the German family policy reforms did generate greater inequalities in 
work-family arrangements across educational groups, such that highly educated families post-
reforms and in counties with expanded access to childcare resemble dual-earner families, while the 






While policies themselves impact behaviors and attitudes, the politics of gender and family 
policies are contentious. The final chapter of this dissertation examines the relative roles of social 
sorting and partisan polarization on gender attitudes in the United States, showing how over time 
the characteristics associated with gender traditionalism/egalitarianism have become more closely 
tied to the same social and identity groups aligned with the two parties. I show that partisanship 
does increasingly matter for gender attitudes, but that the effect of partisanship is conditional on 
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CHAPTER 1: IT’S A FAMILY (POLICY) AFFAIR: FAMILY POLICIES AND 
HETEROGENEITY IN GENDER ATTITUDES 
 
Introduction 
Early work on gender attitudes presumed successive generations of individuals would hold 
more egalitarian gender attitudes as women broke down barriers in the workplace, politics, and at 
home. As female labor force participation, education, and earnings increased and “women-friendly” 
family policies diffused across countries, one might expect egalitarian attitudes to emerge, especially 
among younger cohorts. But instead, scholars of gender attitudes in advanced democracies have 
found more traditional attitudes among younger generations (Charles and Grusky 2004, Cotter et al. 
2011, England 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Shorrocks 2018).  
Given concern about the “stalled revolution” in support for gender egalitarianism, it is 
important to understand if changing attitudes represent a resurgence of traditionalism, or, as Knight 
and Brinton (2017) put it, “varieties of egalitarianism.” Individuals can, and often do, hold different 
attitudes across dimensions of gender attitudes – including combinations of traditional and 
egalitarian attitudes seemingly at odds with one another (Charles and Grusky 2004, Grunow, et al. 
2018, Knight and Brinton 2017, Pepin and Cotter 2018, Scarborough et al. 2019). This literature 
often focuses on two different types of gender attitudes that are the focus here: support for working 
mothers (public sphere) and conservative gender essentialist beliefs (private sphere). Support for 
working mothers assesses beliefs about women’s role in the public sphere, specifically about the 
acceptance of working mothers with young children. Conservative essentialist beliefs are 






I argue these “varieties of egalitarianism” are contextually dependent and rely on a nuanced 
understanding of both family policies and gender attitudes, both which are often measured via a 
single scale. I suggest that family policies affecting the public and private spheres might constrain 
and/or shape attitudes on the corresponding dimension of gender attitude. I employ a policy 
feedback approach (Campbell 2012, Soss and Schram 2007) to understand the relationship between 
family policies and gender attitudes. A country’s family policies differentially constrain a family’s 
decisions about how to best reconcile work and care responsibilities, thereby shaping individuals’ 
material interests. Moreover, they generate norms around expected behaviors even among those not 
directly affected by these policies (Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017).  
Which aspects of family policy regimes generate attitudinal feedback that support different 
gender attitudes towards the public and private spheres, and vice versa? How to conceptualize the 
gendered character of family policies has been a subject of debate for several decades; I follow a 
recent operationalization developed by Lohmann and Zagel (2016). The first are defamilizing 
policies, or those that aim to reduce the economic and care dependencies women, and especially 
mothers, generally face. The second set of policies are familizing ones, or those that institutionalize 
family care responsibilities, potentially also with financial support. Critically, these two sets of 
policies do not exist on a continuum, and countries frequently combine different policies of across 
these policy baskets.  
Defamilizing policies enable mothers to participate in paid work, while familizing policies 
actively reinforce women’s role in the private sphere. I therefore expect significant correspondence 
between policies regarding participation in the public/private spheres and attitudes towards women 
in the public and private spheres, respectively. Attitudes towards working mothers should be 





essentialist beliefs are tied to the extent to which policies actively familize care responsibilities and 
reinforce the position of mothers as primarily caregivers.  
While working mothers have become a reality in most countries, the second half of the 
gender revolution at home remains a challenge. In particular, while governments have abandoned 
traditionalist policies, some, including those intended to support women’s workforce participation, 
do not necessarily lead to gender equality in the home. Therefore, I also assess the implications of 
critiques of defamilization, specifically with regard to men’s role in the home and the independent 
role of women’s labor force participation, on attitudes.   
I assess this empirically by combining an original dataset of family policies for nineteen 
advanced democracies from with waves of EVS and ISSP survey data from 1988-2013 on gender 
attitudes for adults born after 1970. I find defamilization associated with support for working 
mothers, while familization structures conservative essentialist beliefs. This analysis shows how 
family policy regimes, in a more fine-grained way than previously understood, shape different sets of 
gender attitudes. The results suggest that gender attitudes reflect the configuration of family policies 
and the relative weight these policies place on women’s roles in either sphere.  
Gender Attitudes: Change and Dimensionality 
How gender attitudes fluctuate across time and space is a matter of considerable scholarship. 
While early research on gender role attitudes found gradual increases in egalitarian attitudes across all 
societies and generations (see Ferree 1974; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Tallichet and Willits 1986), 
recent work demonstrates that younger cohorts are sometimes likely to express more conservative 
gender attitudes (Cotter et al. 2011; Charles and Grusky 2004; Pepin and Cotter 2018; Shorrocks 
2018). Some of this work argues the culprit is generational socialization (Shorrocks 2018), declines in 





femininity, masculinity and mother-/fatherhood (Pepin and Cotter 2018), and changes to the 
feminist movement itself (Gerson 2010). 
How these studies conceptualize and measure gender attitudes is critical for understanding 
their implications. Some of this work uses unidimensional scales to measure ideologies ranging from 
traditional to egalitarian, with traditional attitudes underscoring beliefs in essential differences and 
divisions of labor in the home and at work (Ciabattari 2001, Cotter et al. 2011, Inglehart and Norris 
2003). Treating gender attitudes as belonging to a single construct – consisting of questions 
concerning motherhood, suitability for politics, and male primacy – produces more reliable results, 
but comes at the cost of understanding the complexity of gender ideologies. 
By contrast, recent work conceptualizes gender attitudes as differences in kind, in addition to 
degree, with substantial implications for understanding attitudinal change. This scholarship has 
revealed that there are many ways in which individuals hold mixes of traditional and egalitarian 
attitudes across subdimensions (Charles and Grusky 2004, Grunow, et al. 2018, Pepin and Cotter 
2018, Scarborough, et al. 2019). While traditional attitudes of the past have waned, they have been 
replaced by different groupings of gender attitudes, leading Knight and Brinton (2017) to conclude 
there are several ‘types’ of egalitarianism in Europe today (see also Grunow et al. 2018, Scarborough 
et al. 2019). 
If the answer to understanding younger individuals’ attitudes lies in the heterogeneity of 
gender attitudes across its subdimensions, which dimensions are particularly important? This 
literature has, in different contexts, shown there are two important subdimensions of gender 
attitudes of interest: attitudes towards women in the public and private spheres (England 2010, 
Gerson 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018). This distinction has recently been revisited as scholars have 
found that individuals attach different meanings to work and family spheres (England 2010, Gerson 





Moreover, there are differing trends on either dimension, reflecting the emergence of 
“varieties of egalitarianism.” The acceptance of women in the public sphere has far outpaced 
acceptance of changing roles in the private sphere (Mason and Lu 1988). In their work on younger 
generations’ attitudes, several studies report increasing acceptance of women in the workplace 
(Pepin and Cotter 2018, Shorrocks 2018). At the same time, attitudes towards women in the private 
sphere (as caregivers) have been resistant to change (Cotter et al. 2011, Crompton and Lyonette 
2005, England 2010, Pepin and Cotter 2018). This suggests that despite women’s increased labor 
force participation, gender attitudes are not moving in an egalitarian direction consistent with a 
unidimensional conceptualization of attitudes. Rather, these sub-dimensions might be differentially 
shaped by the particular ways in which family policies support different behaviors and norms around 
gender.  
I therefore focus on two questions related to the public/private dimensions for which long-
running survey data exists: support for working mothers - are children harmed when mothers work - 
and conservative essentialism - beliefs that men and women belong in separate spheres and have 
natural inclinations towards each (Crompton and Lyonette 2005).  
Support for Working Mothers 
Acceptance of women in the public sphere has developed alongside demand for labor post-
World War II, the expansion of the service sector, and family policies that support women’s entry 
into the workforce. Mothers stepping into the labor force in critical numbers influenced the 
socialization experience for young children, seeding new gender norms (England 2010, Sutfin et al. 
2008, Yu and Lee 2013). Similarly, fathers’ increased involvement in childcare and housework signals 
the end of rigid separation of gendered roles, likely reducing perceptions parents cannot be 





with contemporary conceptions of autonomy, “choice,” and (neo-)liberalism (Percheski 2008, Yu 
and Lee 2013). 
Traditional Essentialist Beliefs 
Questions about gender essentialism measure attitudes towards the private sphere, 
concerning the normatively “proper” roles for men and women and including questions about 
inherent desires or traits. These questions therefore also tap into conceptions of masculinity and 
fatherhood. Changes in this realm are more contested, as scholars suggest the gender revolution in 
the home is more difficult to achieve, even as barriers for women in the workplace have been 
broken down (England 2010, Goldscheider et al. 2015, Yu and Lee 2013).  While men’s involvement 
in the household has increased over time, Hook (2010) shows that men’s uptake of typically-
gendered housework has slowed in the recent past and remains lower than women’s, leading to a 
“double burden” (Collins 2019, Hochschild and Machung 1989). 
Essentialism has also been made compatible with feminist discourses and culture. (Neo-
)liberal ideologies have become intertwined with gender egalitarianism in ways that perpetuate 
essentialist beliefs. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, (neo-) liberalism is integrated with the 
rhetoric of ‘choice’ to frame persistent gender inequalities as merely the result of an aggregation of 
women’s preferences and valuation of different goals in life (Bjarnason and Hjamsdottir 2008, 
Crompton and Lyonette 2005). While formally neutral, this views gender inequalities, divisions of 
unpaid labor, and segregated gender roles ultimately as individual “choices,” effectively depoliticizing 
and downplaying the relevance of gender (Ferugson 2010). 
Essentialist attitudes therefore may or may not coincide with support for working mothers. 
In fact, research has documented diverging trends in these dimensions of attitudes and the 
emergence of different combinations of attitudes across countries (Cotter et al. 2011, Grunow et al. 





time and place should illuminate when and where different groupings – or “varieties” – of attitudes 
might emerge.    
The Role of Context  
Previous work has suggested some associations between gender ideologies and family 
policies. However, this research has frequently been limited over time and space (Grunow et al., 
Sjöberg 2004, Lomazzi et al. 2018), measures of family policies (Lomazzi et al. 2018), or 
conceptualization of gender attitudes (Sjöberg 2004, Lomazzi et al. 2018).  To what extent 
combinations of the two dimensions - support for working mothers and essentialist beliefs - 
correspond to work-family policies across countries over time remains an important question.  
What form this correspondence between policy and attitudes takes remains a matter of 
debate. According to one perspective, gender ideologies played an instrumental role in the 
development of work-family policies (Lewis et al. 2008, see also Pfau-Effinger 2004). Alternatively, 
the literature on the politics of family policies emphasizes the role of labor market needs, 
demographic stresses, and political competition in driving the development of policies, especially in 
cases of dramatic reforms (Morgan 2013). In many cases, gender ideologies were far more traditional 
than the progressive policies politicians enacted. Some have employed rigorous causal identification 
to examine the effects of family policy reform on women’s work (Ziefle and Gangl 2014, Zoch and 
Hondralis 2017), work commitment (Gangl and Ziefle 2015), and father’s involvement in 
housework and childcare (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011). Zoch and Schober (2018) show in turn 
that expanded childcare led to more egalitarian gender attitudes in Germany, while Wrohlich and 
Unterhofer (2017) find similar effects on individuals indirectly affected by policies. It should also be 
noted that other important “pull” factors also shape these same outcomes.  
Given these complexities, I cannot claim to find narrowly identified causal effects in a single 





dimensions of family policies associated with different types of gender attitudes around the 
postindustrial world, whether policy structures attitudes or the other way around is, for this study, 
relatively less important. Nevertheless, I employ a policy feedback approach to understand this 
relationship. This approach understands policy changes and legacies as events which restructure 
future politics in a cyclical manner. The literature on comparative social policy focuses on two 
mechanisms affecting attitudes: changes in opportunity structures (material interests) and norms 
(psychological adaptations) (Gangl and Ziefle 2015). Completing the cycle, these orientations and 
attitudes in the form of cultural frames become drivers of the policymaking process themselves. 
Changes in attitudes follow the two mechanisms outlined by the social policy literature, 
which may operate on different timelines. New institutional arrangements create new material 
interests for those most affected by the policies while policy change alters the costs and 
opportunities of different work-life arrangements. Changes might occur relatively quickly as parents 
benefit from the new scheme. Importantly, how social policies are experienced and perceived may 
differ from their intended effects (see Stadelmann-Steffen and Oehrli 2017).  How policies change 
norms around parenthood is likely a slower process, though there is some evidence of rapid 
adaptation (Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). This work suggests that analyzing attitudinal 
responsiveness to family policies should take into account complex temporal processes.  
How, and when, should family policies shape gender attitudes? Without significant policy 
changes, we can expect substantial congruence between policies and attitudes. When policy change 
occurs, there is likely a period of incongruence or even backlash if the issue is highly politicized (see 
Naumann 2014), followed by change as material interests are transformed. Second, a broader 
alignment of attitudes with new institutional arrangements occurs over long periods of time due to 
cohort replacement. The scope of this article means I am only able to capture a snapshot of the 





I contend the case of family policies and gender attitudes may be different. First, gender 
attitudes vary due to both life cycle and cohort replacement effects (Brewster and Padavic 2000). 
Second, family policies are both highly visible and proximate – a key assumption undergirding the 
relationship between attitudes and policies (Soss and Schram 2007). But family policies are unique in 
that they are proximate especially for younger individuals whose lived experiences of parenthood or 
prospects of parenthood are directly affected by policy. Dramatic changes in family policies, which 
have occurred in many post-industrial democracies, set different parameters around how parents 
negotiate work and care. While full-scale attitudinal change may take decades, I assess the 
correspondence between attitudes and policies in the short time after policies transform the 
experience of parenthood. 
 
Family Policies: Defamilization and Familization 
The remaining question is which elements of family policy promote egalitarian or traditional 
attitudes on the two dimensions of gender attitudes examined here. Family policies are 
heterogenous, including childcare, working time accommodations, maternity and parental leave, and 
the financial position of families with children, all of which form the critical context in which 
individuals make decisions and form opinions about how to organize care and work responsibilities. 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Family Policies 
Scholars have long pointed out the differing consequences of welfare state policies on 
gender inequalities in the home and society. The original critiques of welfare state theories were that 
they ignored women’s positions while at the same time took for granted mothers’ unpaid labor in 
the home (Lewis 1992, Orloff 1993). A resulting rich literature has developed that centers women’s 
role in welfare state policies, integrating it to analyses of welfare provision through the market, state, 





different ways: states can support the extension of public childcare facilities, reinforce social 
responsibilities between family members, or rely on market provision (Esping-Andersen 1999, 
Leitner 2003). Where and how policies place care burdens are critical to understanding their 
relationship to attitudes.   
The concept of defamilization, with an opposing pole of familization, arose as scholars 
sought to understand women’s positions in different welfare states. While there are competing 
definitions, the concept seeks to assess the extent to which individuals can uphold a socially 
acceptable standard of living independent of the family (“individualization,” Lister 1994) or women’s 
ability to form and maintain households of their own without a male head (Orloff 1993). 
Defamilization encompasses two sub-components: women’s economic independence and the 
removal of intergenerational care dependencies (Lister 1994, McLaughlin and Glendinning 1994, 
Orloff 1993, Saraceno 1994). Defamilization’s roots are in the concept of de-commodification, 
implying there is an element of ‘commodification’ of mothers that has to occur before (mostly) 
women can be unburdened through state or market interventions. Defamilization therefore relates 
to women’s participation in the public sphere, specifically on the labor market. 
The extent of (de)familization depends on how policies shape gender and family relations. 
The most important policy distinction is whether spending on family benefits funds services or 
subsidies directly to families (Leitner 2003, Saraceno and Keck 2010, Korpi 2000). State provision of 
childcare has an unambiguously defamilizing effect because it relieves mothers of care burdens and 
allows them to participate in the workforce, often in an expanded public sector. Market provision of 
childcare could theoretically be considered defamilizing, but is class-biased; a families’ ability to 
purchase childcare and the quality of childcare varies greatly with income. Parental leave can have a 
defamilizing effect, but this depends on its structure. Shorter, job-protected leaves at higher pay 





leaves. Defamilizing policies, then, are “pull” factors related to women’s workforce participation. 
Women in countries with extensive policy support should be more likely to participate in the 
workforce, even with young children (Huber et al. 2009, Nelson and Stephens 2013). 
Familizing policies explicitly maintain and reinforce dependencies among family members by 
promoting family care for children and the elderly. These policies lower the social and economic 
consequences for women who step out of the labor force (Leitner 2003, Saraceno and Keck 2010). 
They ‘familize’ by making acceptable and legal arrangements where mothers remain primary 
caregivers. The primary policy instruments include: cash transfers and tax benefits for children, 
pension credits for care, and long-term, low-paid leaves. Long leave entitlements encourage women 
to step out of the labor force for long periods, making reentry less probable (Morgan and Zippel 
2003). Direct and indirect transfers, in the form of cash benefits and tax credits and deductions, 
familize care responsibilities by enabling and subsidizing (mostly) women’s role as primary caregivers 
(Jaumotte 2003). These policies constitute significant deterrents to workforce participation; mothers 
in countries with higher levels of familization tend to work part time, earn lower shares of 
household income, and perform more housework (Alper 2019, Hook 2015, Kleider 2015).  
Because family policy covers a range of policy instruments and states can – and often do – 
combine defamilizing and familizing policies, the extent of defamilization/familization does not lie 
on a single continuum (Leitner 2003, Lohmann and Zagel 2016, Saraceno and Keck 2010). What are 
the implications of this framework for gender equality? These different combinations of family 
policies – especially because they tend to be patterned by variations in political configurations – 
constitute different “varieties” of family policies and gender relations. Defamilizing policies were 
often developed in response to concerns over welfare state sustainability and fertility, and women’s 
(lack of) participation in paid work. As a result, they have been a means to encourage women’s labor 





has been a secondary goal (Lewis and Giullari 2005, see also Blum 2014, Morel 2007, Morgan 2013). 
In her critique of emergent “adult-worker models,” Daly (2011) argues that the evolution of policies 
points towards a dual-earner, but gender-specialized family arrangement (see also Fraser 1994). 
While defamilizing policies resolve labor force attachment and childcare concerns for women, they 
neglect to meaningfully address gender inequality in the home, leaving men’s roles untouched (Ciccia 
and Bleijenbergh 2014, Ciccia and Verloo 2012, Lewis and Giullari 2005).  While having working 
mothers might lead to more equitable distributions of housework, working mothers are still are 
expected to be primary caregivers and perform the bulk of unpaid household labor (Hochschild and 
Machung 1989). 
Because the social rights of women (and men) as workers are more strongly institutionalized 
than parent’s rights to care for their children or a child’s right to care (Leira 1998), the concept of 
(de)familization is perhaps a poor metric against which to judge policies that encourage men’s 
participation in housework and childcare. For the most part, parental leaves are overwhelmingly 
taken by women. Only a small number of (highly educated) fathers take any leave that is a family 
entitlement, especially when they are poorly paid (Leave Network Report 2019). Similarly, public 
childcare allows and encourages women to work without necessarily encouraging men’s 
involvement. Defamilization, then, undervalues family care and parent’s right to care time (Knijn 
and Kremer 1997). If care by both parents were equally valued, as suggested by Fraser’s (1994) 
universal caregiver model, these policies could also be considered familizing, but with altogether 
different consequences for gender equality. 
One way to address this gap is by interrogating policies that actively seek to reshape care 
responsibilities. Ciccia and Verloo (2012) introduce several measures that better measure the 
consequences of leave policies for gender equality in the home (see Table 1). These policies are 





in the home. One key policy instrument is “use it or lose it” fathers’ month, which might induce 
fathers to take leave, which has led to greater involvement in childcare, housework, and changing 
social norms of fatherhood (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011, Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). This is 
especially true where these leaves are well paid, and these policies are at their most effective when 
they can be taken flexibly and non-simultaneously with a mothers’ leave (Ciccia and Verloo 2012).  
Finally, women’s labor force participation is not itself a ‘policy,’ strictly speaking, but high 
levels of women’s labor force participation are a consequence of gender-neutral family policy 
regimes. High levels of female labor force participation may also reflect ‘push’ factors beyond the 
scope of family policies, such as economic necessity. 
Expectations 
The literature suggests a multi-dimensional conceptualization of gender attitudes and family 
policies should be a starting point for research on the relationship between family policies and 
gender attitudes. I focus on two dimensions outlined in the gender attitudes literature that are of 
substantive interest: attitudes towards working mothers and essentialist beliefs. In the previous 
section, I outlined two sets of family policies with differing consequences for women in the public 
and private spheres. A policy feedback approach suggests family policies shape gender attitudes 
through opportunity structure and norm-setting mechanisms, meaning that we should expect to see 
congruence between the two as policies are enacted and mature. The specific ways in which the 
gendered features of the welfare state interact should shed light on different varieties of 
egalitarianism, present across the world today. 
Defamilizing policies enable women to participate in paid work through alleviating care 
burdens, especially for mothers with younger children. On average shorter but better remunerated 
leaves encourage women’s return to the workforce after childbirth. This, combined with high-quality 





members to provide informal childcare, allowing them to participate in fully paid work. Independent 
of the presence of defamilizing policies, high levels of women’s workforce participation similarly 
support acceptance of mothers as workers, as this alters households and socialization environments 
for children and perpetuate norms around working mothers (Bolzendahl and Meyers 2004; 
Ciabattari 2001; Fan and Marini 2000, Sutfin et al. 2008). Policy defamilization and women’s labor 
force participation are therefore closely related to one of the attitudinal dimensions examined here: 
support for working mothers.  
Familizing policies promote women’s role as a primary caregivers and confinement to the 
private sphere through cash for care schemes, low and poorly paid leaves, and tax benefits for single 
earner couples. By reinforcing and actively supporting traditionally gendered roles, these policies 
map onto (endorsements of) essentialist beliefs. Women’s labor force participation may also support 
and reflect essentialist attitudes, especially where market activating pressures push mothers into the 
labor force and produce stark inequalities in access to childcare and leave. Mothers in these 
situations report facing the greatest pressures to be a ‘supermom’ and devote significant effort to 
both care and career (Collins 2019). This pressuring of work without support might make apparent 
certain benefits of or nostalgia for traditional arrangements (England 2010). 
But gender equality in the private sphere, and specifically men’s involvement in it, sits 
uncomfortably within the concepts of (de)familization.  These critiques argue that policies 
transforming gender roles should lure non-carers into care through use it or lose it “daddy” months 
with generous compensation to offset potential losses of family income. I expect measures of leave 
policies specifically intended to transform gender roles to be associated with egalitarian gender 








I have created a new dataset containing annual measures of family policies for nineteen 
advanced democracies from 1980 to the present. The countries include nineteen advanced 
democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. I collected data on the measures found in Table 1 to create the defamilization 
and familization indices from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) and Ciccia and Verloo’s (2012) measures. 
All of these measures were originally only created for a single year, so putting them to the empirical 
test over time serves an important purpose in validating them. Though these are complex concepts, 
their measurement here is reduced to two dimensions for simplicity. While there are other datasets 
of leave and childcare policies - for example, SPIN, Multilinks, and Gauthier (2011) – they do not 
contain enough measures or coverage over time and space to analyze their effect on gender 
attitudes. The SPIN data is only measured once every five years, and lacks some of the measures 
capturing the gendered nature of the welfare state. Multilinks, despite having most of the desired 
measures, only covers 2004 and has some incomplete data for 2009. Gauthier’s data was 
foundational, but lacks several indicators and coverage over time. 
 
Table 1 lists the individual measures that are used to create the defamilization/familization 
indices and Ciccia and Verloo’s (2012) measures. I collected data from a variety of sources; details 
on data collection of each measure shown in Table 1 can be found in the Appendix in Table A1. 
The indicators making up the defamilization and familization indices are first standardized between 
0 and 1 (by year) and then summed in an index, following Lohmann and Zagel’s (2016) approach. 






Table 1: Family Policy Measures 
Family Policy Measures, 1980-present 
Defamilizing 
Policies 
Individual Entitlement to Childcare for Children < 3 (Yes/No) 
Enrollment in Formal Childcare (3-5 year olds) 
Public Spending on Daycare (% GDP) 
Duration of Well-Paid Leave (Months) 





Universal Child Allowances (Yes/No) 
Tax Deduction or Credit for Children (Yes/No) 
Child Allowance for 1 Child (share net avg. wages) 
Child Allowance for 3 Children (share net avg. wages) 
Tax Benefits to Families (share net avg. wages) 




Reliance on Family Care (total leave time) 
Monetary Value of Family Care (FTE leave/total leave time 
ratio) 
Concentration of care work (gender concentration of leave) 
Fatherhood Opportunity Index 
Note: Measures of Defamilizing and Familizing Policies adapted from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) to 
allow for measures across years. Gender Equality Index adapted from Ciccia and Verloo (2012). Data 






I also replicate Ciccia and Verloo’s (2012) measures of family policy. The first, reliance on 
family care, measures the total extent of parental leave time – regardless of remuneration. The 
monetary value of care calculates the equivalent leave that is available at full pay divided by the total 
leave time available. The concentration of care work measures parents’ relative entitlements to care, 
calculated as the ratio of mothers’ to fathers’ full-time equivalent entitlements. When this measure 
equals 1, both parents have a right to equal leave durations, while a zero means only a mother has 
leave entitlements. Shared leave is not counted in this index because shared leave is almost entirely 
taken by women. The final measure, the fatherhood index, measures the type, length, and pay of 
paternity leaves. 
Figure 1: Family Policies in 2010 
 
Note: Data from author’s calculations and multiple sources. See Table 1 for scale construction. The greyed terms refer to 
Leitner’s (2003) and Saraceno and Keck (2010) typologies of family policies.  
Public opinion data on gender attitudes come from combining all waves of the EVS/WVS 
and ISSP “Family and Changing Gender Roles” modules. This gives me more continuous coverage 





attitudes: support for working mothers and conservative essentialist beliefs. I focus on two measures 
with the largest coverage across both ISSP and WVS/EVS in order to expand the statistical power 
of the models. Disagreement with “A child suffers when the mother works when a child is young,” 
measures support for working mothers, while agreement with “Being a housewife is as fulfilling as 
working for pay,” measures essentialist beliefs. Variables are recoded such that higher values indicate 
more egalitarian/non-traditional responses. In the Appendix (Table A4) I model the relationships 
with three alternative dependent variables.  
The final dataset is of gender attitudes and family policies for 19 countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the U.S) for 
surveys taken between 1988 and 2013. I exclude East Germany because of Germany’s internally 
heterogeneous policies. I exclusively look at younger individuals born after 1970, capturing people of 
the same cohort at different ages and narrowly addressing the question about the resurgence of 
conservative gender attitudes among younger generations. 
Methods 
This analysis employs a combination of country-year level contextual and survey data in 
multi-level models. This modelling technique accounts for variation within various nested groups, in 
this case individuals nested in countries nested in years. Whereas standard OLS-regression models 
assume independence among units, the assumption undergirding multi-level models is that the 
interdependence within units is stronger than that between units (i.e. people in the same country are 
more similar to one another than those in other countries, or that countries are more similar to 
themselves in consecutive years than they are to other countries). A random intercept model is used 
such that country-year level indicators have different intercepts but the same slope. 





hierarchical models with relatively few upper level clusters – in this case – countries and years. Elff 
et al. (2019) find that the actual parameter (coefficient) estimates do not suffer from bias, but 
caution that the test statistic (used to determine statistical significance) can err. They recommend 
using an REML (between-within) estimator with an adjusted test statistic of a t distribution with df 
= clusters – predictors – 1 to account for a relatively small number of clusters. This results in highly 
conservative estimates and penalizes the inclusion of additional country-level variables. Importantly, 
it leaves unchanged the test statistic for individual level variables, such that the degrees of freedom 
for individual level variables remains equal to the sample size minus the number of micro level 
predictors.  
Analysis was done using the nlme package in R, which uses a between-within estimator Elff 
et al. (2019) suggest. Time is modelled as a quadratic following Carter and Signorino (2010), allowing 
me to account for temporal interdependence. Survey weights are used rescaled with the parameters 
package in R such that they can be used with the nlme package. I include the following set of 
individual level controls: age, sex, education (ISCED), religious attendance, religion, marital status, 
number of children, and employment status. At the country level, I introduce my measures of 
defamilization and familization to the model. I add measures for female labor force participation and 
welfare state generosity as political economy variables. 
A policy feedback approach suggests there may be different time horizons at which attitudes 
align with family policies. The implementation of reforms takes time. Initially, incongruence is to be 
expected: there may be backlash and individuals have not yet experienced the effect of new policies. 
As time passes, I expect greater alignment of attitudes and family policies, not the least because for 
younger individuals, family policies set different parameters and expectations around early 
parenthood. Therefore, I lag family policies of five years ago to the survey data, and in the Appendix 






Table 2: Multi Level Models of Support for Working Mothers 
  Dependent Variable 
  Working Mothers 
 (1) (2) 
Age 0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Sex 0.229*** (0.018) 0.223*** (0.018) 
Religious Attendance (Never) 0.044*** (0.005) 0.042*** (0.005) 
Education 0.101*** (0.007) 0.100*** (0.007) 
Children -0.040*** (0.011) -0.039*** (0.010) 
L-R Placement -0.030*** (0.005) -0.032*** (0.004) 
Employed 0.092*** (0.021) 0.106*** (0.020) 
Religion (ref: Secular)   
Catholic -0.043 (0.028) -0.040 (0.027) 
Orthodox -0.189** (0.085) -0.198** (0.082) 
Protestant 0.019 (0.029) 0.010 (0.028) 
Muslim -0.719*** (0.067) -0.708*** (0.066) 
Other -0.288*** (0058) -0.303*** (0.056) 
Marital Status (ref: Married)   
Cohabitating -0.020 (0.044) -0.023 (0.043) 
Divorced 0.052 (0.061) 0.016 (0.056) 
Separated 0.004 (0.072) -0.019 (0.069) 
Widowed 0.012 (.231) -0.045 (0.207) 
Single 0.010 (0.026) -0.012 (0.025) 
Country Level Variables   
Defamilization 0.266*** (0.071) 0.296*** (0.077) 
Familization -0.060 (0.066) -0.052 (0.067) 
Female LF Participation 0.012 (0.008) 0.013* (0.008) 
Welfare State Generosity  -0.014 (0.011) 
Time 0.028 (0.138) -0.082 (0.070) 
Time2 -0.001 (0.009) 0.006 (0.005) 
Time3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Constant 1.859** (0.805) 2.724*** (0.599) 
Observations 17098 15822 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 49455.24 52937.17 
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  49662.53 53154.04 






Table 2 shows the results from the models assessing attitudes towards the consequences of 
working mothers. In each case, the individual level variables behave predictably, and because the 
interest is on contextual effects, I will focus on the differences among country level variables. As 
expected, defamilization, or the extent to which policies support mother’s ability to reconcile work 
and family, is statistically and substantively significantly related to more egalitarian attitudes towards 
working mothers. A one-point increase in defamilization, roughly a one standard deviation change in 
defamilization, is associated with about 6% increase in egalitarian attitudes, which amounts to a 22% 
across the full scale of defamilization. 
In Model 2, I include welfare state generosity, to control for welfare state effort, especially to 
assess the impact in places where welfare states do very little. Except for defamilization, neither of 
the other country level variables are significant. Familization, which incentivizes traditionally 
gendered behaviors and stay at home parenting, has a negative sign, but is far from statistical 
significance. Female labor force participation does cross the p < 0.10 threshold, suggesting higher 
levels of female labor force participation are associated with more egalitarian attitudes. When the 
models are separately run by sex (see Appendix Table 1.5), the effect of a country’s female labor 
force participation has a significant effect at the 0.05 level, but only for women. The positive sign for 
female labor force participation is in line with an argument that policies aside, there is an 
independent effect of labor force participation, which through changes in norms and behaviors is 
associated with support for working mothers. 
Substantively, this suggests the gender attitude dimension of support for women in public 
spheres like work, even in the presence of small children, is strongly related to contexts in which 
women a) are more likely to work and b) where that work is supported by policies that, by design, 
are intended to increase women’s economic independence through shorter, well paid leaves and by 





mothers, then, would be found in contexts with significant policy development on the defamilization 
dimension and high levels of workforce participation (for example, Scandinavia). The lowest levels, 
by contrast, are found in places with low levels of defamilization and low levels of labor force 
participation, for example those in Southern Europe.  
Table 3: Multi Level Models of Essentialist Beliefs 
  Dependent Variable 
  Essentialism 
 (1) (2) 
Age 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
Sex 0.160*** (0.018) 0.160*** (0.019) 
Religious Attendance (Never) 0.051*** (0.005) 0.052*** (0.005) 
Education 0.053*** (0.006) 0.052*** (0.007) 
Children -0.018* (0.010) -0.020* (0.011) 
L-R Placement -0.026*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.005) 
Employed 0.130*** (0.020) 0.135*** (0.021) 
Religion (ref: Secular)   
Catholic -0.019 (0.026) -0.024 (0.028) 
Orthodox -0.022 (0.085) -0.074 (0.088) 
Protestant 0.012 (0.028) 0.014 (0.029) 
Muslim -0.103 (0.065) -0.094 (0.067) 
Other 0.011 (0.053) -0.009 (0.055) 
Marital Status (ref: Married)   
Cohabitating 0.046 (0.036) 0.058 (0.038) 
Divorced 0.074 (0.058) 0.068 (0.063) 
Separated 0.230*** (0.066) 0.263*** (0.070) 
Widowed -0.086 (0.222) -0.056 (0.241) 
Single 0.143*** (0.025) 0.157*** (0.026) 
Country Level Variables   
Defamilization 0.084 (0.070) 0.032 (0.070) 
Familization -0.131** (0.058) -0.147** (0.059) 
Female LF Participation -0.016** (0.007) -0.020*** (0.006) 
Welfare State Generosity  0.024** (0.010) 
Time -0.014 (0.066) -0.155 (0.128) 
Time2 -0.00 (0.005) 0.008 (0.008) 
Time3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Constant 4.062*** (0.498) 4.284*** (0.766) 





Akaike Inf. Crit. 70370.92 64370.07 
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  70586.03 64590.65 
Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01  
 
Table 3 assesses the impact of family policies on conservative essentialism. Here, the results 
suggest that defamilization, or support for two-earner couples, is positively signed, but not 
significantly related to essentialist beliefs. However, the extent to which family policies explicitly 
support traditional households via long (un)paid leaves and child allowances for mothers is 
significantly related to traditional (essentialist) beliefs. A one unit shift in familization is associated 
with 3 percent change in essentialist beliefs (about 11 percent moving over the full range of 
familization). This provides evidence for the idea that policies supporting traditional families and 
gendered arrangements is associated with more traditional visions of women’s roles in society. 
Moreover, it suggests conservative essentialist beliefs are most strongly driven by the extent of 
policies’ support for traditional families irrespective of how much policies support working mothers. 
Several of the country level controls are significant in these models. In line with 
expectations, female labor force participation here has a negative sign and is significant, suggesting 
that after controlling for family policies, countries and years with high levels of female labor force 
participation are associated with more traditional beliefs about men’s and women’s places in society. 
These findings for the additional country controls are in keeping with findings from the 
previous section that showed familism by default, or countries with a lack of support for families 
with children overall, is associated in recent years with more conservative beliefs. While it is not 
possible to parse this out here, it may point to a backlash against situations where it is extremely 
difficult, especially for lower-resource families, to balance work and care responsibilities. The tension 
between work and care may make apparent the benefits of or generate nostalgia for traditional 





Anglo-Saxon countries like Australia and the United States (Cotter et al. 2011, Pepin and Cotter 
2018). In those contexts, but not exclusively, egalitarian essentialism is most tied to neoliberal 
discourses of ‘choice’ and personal responsibility for childcare, which is seen as an exclusively 
private matter (Bjarnason and Hjalmsdottir 2008, Crompton and Lyonette 2005).  
Finally, I also hypothesized that taking critiques of defamilization and its operationalization 
seriously means examining policies that promote gender equality in the home and between partners. 
Specifically, these critiques argue that defamilization merely allows for women to work and have 
children (addressing fertility and welfare state sustainability concerns), promoting dual-earning 
without promoting dual-caring. But some countries have adopted ‘fathers’ quotas’ that, in some 
cases, mean fathers cannot take leave simultaneously as mothers, meaning they assume full time care 
duties.  It is therefore important to understand if these (recent) changes to family policies to 
encourage men to act as carers have an impact on attitudes. While there is some evidence in 
particular countries (i.e. Norway, see Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011), it is worth investigating in a 
broader manner. To do this, I turn to the additional measures provided by Ciccia and Verloo (2012) 
from Table 1 to assess what additional impact, if any, the more nuanced gendered measures of 
family policies might have on attitudes. 
In each case, the additional measures of gender equality from Ciccia and Verloo (2012) do 
not yield much additional predictive power (Appendix Table 1.6). For working mothers, the 
fatherhood index is significant, rendering the defamilization index insignificant. However, this 
variable is correlated with the defamilization index at 0.81, indicating a strong possibility of 
multicollinearity. For essentialist beliefs, higher valuation of care (i.e. where pay for care approaches 
100% of wages for the full duration of leave) is associated with more traditional attitudes. The lack 
of general support for this hypothesis is possible for several reasons. First, it is possible that many of 





individuals’ attitudes, and that the large number of instances in which the variables are equal to zero 
(for example, where only mothers have access to leave entitlements or where fathers have no right 
to parental leave) for many countries and years skews results. However, as these policies mature, in 
particular the expansion of ‘father’s quotas,’ daycare, and policies like Sweden’s ‘gender equality 
bonus’ intended to incentivize mothers’ return to work, we might expect them to have a greater 
effect on gender attitudes that has been documented in qualitative work.  
Discussion 
This work sheds new light on an important question: how should we interpret findings that 
younger generations of individuals hold mixes of egalitarian and traditional gender attitudes? I argue 
part of the answer lies in understanding the heterogeneity of gender attitudes, and the corresponding 
elements of family policies that support certain beliefs. By operationalizing different dimensions of 
gender attitudes and family policies, I show how unidimensional measures of both family policies 
and gender attitudes might lead to erroneous conclusions about the relationship between the two. 
The resulting configuration of gender attitudes reflects the constraints of family policies on both 
work and home spheres. In doing so, I show Knight and Brinton’s (2017) “varieties of 
egalitarianism” in advanced postindustrial democracies are linked to specific institutional contexts. 
These results show that there is congruence (with important nuance) between attitudes and 
family policies. In the short term, gender attitudes seem to be shaped by policies among the 
population analyzed here – young people of parenting age who are directly affected by family 
policies. In the long term, policy feedback scholars suggest more sweeping attitudinal alignment may 
occur only with cohort replacement, implying these findings represent a lower bound of policies’ 
effects. 
I show that defamilization and familization are exclusively related to specific elements of 





provide high levels of support for dual earner families promote increasingly egalitarian beliefs 
towards working mothers among generations born after 1970. These policies were intended to 
address women’s care and financial independence, and where these policies are developed and 
barriers to women’s full participation in the labor market addressed, more egalitarian attitudes 
emerge. These results also shed light on the limits of policies intended to improve women’s 
economic position through workforce participation, as these policies are not associated with more 
egalitarian beliefs on the essentialist dimension, potentially because these policies do not consistently 
seek to reshape care arrangements. 
By contrast, familist policies are closely associated with endorsements of essentialist beliefs. 
While previous work has found evidence of essentialist attitudes in Anglo-Saxon welfare states 
where the rhetoric of “choice” is more prevalent and women face the greatest work-family 
pressures, I show that these beliefs are more widespread.  
While the concept of (de)familization is complex, here it has been measured via two 
dimensions, which unfortunately limits my ability to fully capture their causes and consequences. For 
example, while in some cases the goal of family policy reforms was to encourage gender equality in 
the home and market (Herenes 1987), in others it was to draw women into the labor force (Morgan 
2013), while in others, like France, policy was explicitly natalist (Morel 2007). Defamilization’s 
impact on gender equality, then, largely depends the benchmarks used to measure gender equality. 
A generation of scholarship viewed women’s incorporation into the labor force as a path to 
equality, as their earnings translated into economic and bargaining power in society and at home. 
These results paint a more complicated picture of the relationship between labor force inclusion and 
gender attitudes. Female labor force participation does promote egalitarian beliefs about working 
mothers, partially corroborating this hypothesis. However, female labor force participation is also 





demonstrates that while women can and have broken barriers in the workplace, it has come along 
with sustained beliefs of mothers as homemakers and caregivers. One potential culprit is that female 
labor force participation and the policies supporting it developed much further than egalitarian care 
policies. As a result, working mothers became a reality much sooner than care policies actively 
sought to reshape care dependencies in the family, resulting in a double burden. 
The configurations of gender attitudes, or varieties of egalitarianism, are linked to different 
combinations of familization and defamilization, which in turn are connected to broader patterns of 
welfare states and welfare state politics (Esping-Andersen 1999, Huber and Stephens 2001).  Unique 
“varieties” of gender attitudes have emerged in advanced democracies, representing complex 
movements away from traditionalism that are not to be mistaken with backlash. These are likely 
stable outcomes, reflecting both historical trajectories and recent transformations of family policies. 
Specifically, combinations of high support for working mothers exist alongside lower 
endorsements of essentialism in Scandinavian countries with high levels of defamilization and low 
levels of familization. These countries with legacies of defamilizing policies have more egalitarian 
attitudes, which provides an important baseline for future policy changes. By contrast, and despite 
the fact that Continental (familist) regimes experienced low fertility, welfare state sustainability 
issues, and pressures to boost women’s labor force participation, these countries have done so in 
ways consistent with their historical trajectories. Heterogeneous mixes of both sets of gender 
attitudes can be expected to prevail where recent reforms have ‘layered on’ defamilizing policies 
while leaving intact many familizing ones. One might expect egalitarian attitudes might emerge, but 
only on the working mothers dimension; there is lingering traditionalism in essentialist beliefs. Taken 
together, this work suggests that rather than understanding contemporary changes in attitudes in 





from traditional attitudes. The gender revolution is incomplete, but this work suggests different 
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Both the defamilization and familization indices borrow from, but ultimately modify, the measures developed by Lohmann and Zagel (2016). 
Historical data on several of their measures, particularly for elder care, are less readily available over time, and are thus excluded from this 
measure. While familization and defamilization is linked to intergenerational dependencies beyond the parent – child one, I only am able to 
focus on parent-child policy measures here. Lohmann and Zagel’s original index included enrollment information for 0-2 year-olds, but this 
is unavailable before 2000. I substitute daycare spending as a % GDP in my calculation of defamilization. I also include tax benefits to families 
(as % APW net wages) in the measure of familization. 
 
Data for additional years were collected from a wide range of sources: 
 
Table 1.4: Family Policy Indicators 
 
Family Policy Indicators, 1980-present  
Defamilizing 
Policies 
Individual Entitlement to Childcare for Children < 3 (Yes/No) SEEPRO-R 
 
Enrollment in Formal Childcare (3-5 year olds) 
 
OECD, World Bank 
















   
Familizing 







Tax Deduction or Credit for Children (Yes/No) Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN 
Child Allowance for 1 Child (share net avg. wages) Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN 
Child Allowance for 3 Children (share net avg. wages) Multilinks, SSPTW, MISSOC, SPIN 
Tax Benefits to Families (share net avg. wages) Gauthier, OECD 































Note: Measures of Defamilizing and Familizing Policies adapted from Lohmann and Zagel (2016) to 
allow for measures across years. Gender Equality Index adapted from Ciccia and Verloo (2012). Data 








Table 1.5: Multi Level Models by Sex 
 Dependent Variable 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 
Religious Attendance (Never) 0.039*** (0.008) 0.048*** (0.007) 0.047*** (0.007) 0.056*** (0.007) 
Education 0.098*** (0.010) 0.036*** (0.010) 0.108*** (0.009) 0.061*** (0.009) 
Children -0.055*** (0.017) 0.007 (0.017) -0.025* (0.014) -0.028* (0.015) 
L-R Placement -0.029*** (0.007) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) -0.028*** (0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
Employed 0.003 (0.033) 0.029 (0.032) 0.150*** (0.027) 0.194*** (0.027) 
Religion (ref: Secular)     
Catholic -0.029 (0.041) -0.003 (0.040) -0.053 (0.038) -0.030 (0.038) 
Orthodox -0.287** (0.122) -0.296** (0.126) -0.157 (0.114) -0.110 (0.120) 
Protestant 0.032 (0.043) 0.073* (0.042) -0.001 (0.041) -0.019 (0.041) 
Muslim -0.708*** (0.097) -0.070 (0.093) -0.740*** (0.094) -0.097 (0.095) 
Other -0.315*** (0.083) 0.024 (0.077) -0.246*** (0.081) -0.032 (0.077) 
Marital Status (ref: Married)     
Cohabitating 0.038 (0.067) 0.081 (0.057) -0.080 (0.059) 0.030 (0.050) 
Divorced -0.036 (0.103) 0.158 (0.105) 0.103 (0.076) 0.019 (0.080) 
Separated -0.138 (0.122) 0.257** (0.121) 0.058 (0.089) 0.276*** (0.086) 
Widowed 0.006 (0.317) 0.222 (0.354) -0.068 (0.339) -0.339 (0.329) 
Single -0.085** (0.041) 0.119*** (0.041) 0.078** (0.033) 0.193*** (0.034) 
Country Level Variables     
Defamilization 0.276*** (0.070) 0.075 (0.070) 0.276*** (0.077) 0.081 (0.076) 
Familization -0.091 (0.068) -0.147** (0.065) -0.039 (0.071) -0.116* (0.060) 





Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 2.370*** (0.852) 4.634*** (0.826) 1.437 (0.890) 4.801*** (0.766) 
Observations 7341 8785 8637 10892 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 22,935.49 28,706.04 26,699.41 36,316.36 
Bayesin Inf. Crit.  23,114.84 28,890.08 26,883.00 36,595.99 




Table 1.6: Multi Level Models with Ciccia and Verloo Measures 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.00) 
Religious Attendance (Never) 0.044*** (0.005) 0.052*** (0.005) 0.044*** (0.005) 0.052*** (0.005) 
Sex 0.232*** (0.019) 0.160*** (0.019) 0.232*** (0.019) 0.160*** (0.019) 
Education 0.100*** (0.007) 0.053*** (0.007) 0.100*** (0.007) 0.053*** (0.007) 
Children -0.042*** (0.011) 0.020* (0.011) -0.042*** (0.011) -0.019* (0.011) 
L-R Placement -0.030*** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.005) -0.030*** (0.005) -0.025*** (0.005) 
Employed 0.097*** (0.021) 0.136*** (0.021) 0.097*** (0.021) 0.136*** (0.021) 
Religion (ref: Secular)     
Catholic -0.045 (0.028) -0.026 (0.028) -0.045 (0.028) -0.026 (0.028) 
Orthodox -0.193** (0.085) -0.075 (0.088) -0.191** (0.085) -0.067 (0.088) 
Protestant 0.017 (0.030) 0.012 (0.029) 0.017 (0.030) 0.013 (0.029) 
Muslim -0.720*** (0.067) -0.094 (0.067) -0.720*** (0.067) -0.095 (0.067) 
Other -0.289*** (0.058) -0.009 (0.055) -0.289*** (0.058) -0.009 (0.055) 
Marital Status (ref: Married)     





Divorced 0.045 (0.061) 0.068 (0.063) 0.045 (0.061) 0.068 (0.063) 
Separated 0.003 (0.073) 0.265*** (0.070) 0.003 (0.073) 0.265*** (0.070) 
Widowed 0.013 (0.231) -0.056 (0.241) 0.013 (0.231) -0.056 (0.241) 
Single 0.006 (0.026) 0.157*** (0.026) 0.006 (0.026) 0.158*** (0.026) 
Country Level Variables     
Defamilization 0.156 (0.112) 0.008 (0.102)   
Familization -0.013 (0.068) -0.143** (0.060)   
Female LF Participation 0.010 (0.008) -0.019** (0.007) 0.010 (0.008) -0.018** (0.007) 
Fatherhood Index 0.035*** (0.016) -0.001 (0.014) 0.044*** (0.014) 0.004 (0.013) 
Monetary Value of Care 0.220 (0.305) -0.457* (0.249) 0.283 (0.306) -0.428* (0.244) 
Gender Concentration Care -0.012 (0.157) -0.023 (0.136) 0.016 (0.157) -0.009 (0.136) 
Total Fertility Rate 0.506* (0.276) -0.324 (0.252) 0.595** (0.269) -0.314 (0.233) 
Welfare State Generosity -0.006 (0.012) 0.021* (0.011) -0.003 (0.012) 0.016 (0.010) 
Women in Parliament (Cumul.) -0.016 (0.021) 0.039** (0.019) -0.007 (0.020) 0.037** (0.017) 
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 1.535 (0.971) 4.818*** (0.884) 1.430 (0.968) 4.615*** (0.865) 
Observations 15822 19521 15822 19521 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 48,996.53 64,388.34 48,988.29 64,383.46 
Bayesin Inf. Crit.  49,249.54 64,648.31 49,225.98 64,627.67 




Table 1.7: Multi Level Models with Alternative Dependent Variables 
 Dependent Variable 







  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 0.002 (0.002) 
-0.013*** 



















































































Protestant 0.013 (0.028) 
-0.068** 
















(0.073) -0.253*** (0.056) 0.010 (0.053) 
-0.291*** 
(0.074) 
Marital Status (ref: 





(0.072) -0.076* (0.043) 0.046 (0.036) 
-0.042 
(0.059) 
Divorced 0.021 (0.056) 
0.126** 



























(0.027) 0.045* (0.023) 
0.144*** 
(0.025) 0.045 (0.028) 



























Observations 17,262 13,516 17,284 21,336 14,443 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 53,436.68 42,492.02 51,681.45 70,365.23 46,059.25 
Bayesin Inf. Crit.  53,638.31 42,679.77 51,883.11 70,572.37 46256.24 
Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01     
 
 
This table demonstrates the general pattern of the relationship between family policies and the two dimensions of gender attitudes holds 
across different specifications of the dependent variable. Model 3, for the dependent variable relationship with a working mother, is a 
reverse coded question, and the measure of defamilization just barely misses conventional statistical significance (p = 0.0612). In model 5, 
the alternative dependent variable for essentialist beliefs, the measure of defamilization reaches statistical significance at the p < 0.10 level, 
which perhaps reflects the reduced statistical power that comes from a smaller sample of years and countries. I theorized that for 







Table 1.8: Multi Level Models with Alternative Lag Structures 
 Dependent Variable 
 Essentialism Working Mothers 
 No Lag 3 Years 7 Years No Lag 3 Years 7 Years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

























































Religion (ref: Secular)       
Catholic -0.019 (0.026) -0.019 (0.026) -0.019 (0.027) -0.039 (0.027) -0.039 (0.027) -0.038 (0.027) 






















Marital Status (ref: Married)       







(0.066) 0.022 (0.056) 0.021 (0.056) 0.021 (0.056) 











(0.025) -0.010 (0.024) -0.010 (0.024) -0.010 (0.024) 
Country Level Variables       





Familization -0.010 (0.057) -0.097* (0.055) 
-0.141** 
(0.062) -0.099 (0.066) -0.055 (0.067) 
-0.110* 
(0.0661) 
Female LF Participation -0.014* (0.007) -0.013* (0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 0.013 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) 0.010 (0.007) 
Time Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -2.595 (10.530) 
3.750*** 







Observations 21,336 21,336 21,336 17,262 17,262	 17,262	
Akaike Inf. Crit. 70,349.62 50,374.71 69,197.77 53,419.91 53,449.99 53,410.92 
Bayesian Inf. Crit.  70,548.80 70,589.82 69,412.43 53,613.79 53,659.37 53,604.13 
Note: * p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01      
 
In the main text, family policies are lagged at five years – meaning family policies five years ago predict gender attitudes. This is in keeping 
with the literature suggesting that policy implementation takes time, and that the direct effects of family policy changes might take years to 
play out, by virtue of individuals facing different opportunity structures and constraints when they form a family and have children (See 
Unterhofer and Wrohlich, 2017, and Ziefle and Gangl, 2014 for evidence of how changes in family policies affect attitudes). As such, the 
results become stronger with increasing lags – at no lag (family policies at time t predicting gender attitudes at time t) there is little evidence 
of a relationship between the main independent variables (family policy defamilization and familization) and the outcome (attitudes towards 
working mothers and conservative essentialist beliefs). At the t-3, there is evidence of statistical significance, familization is negatively 
associated with a lack of essentialist beliefs at the 0.10 level, while defamilization is associated with more accepting attitudes towards working 
mothers at the .05 level. Once we reach a lag of 7 years, both are significant at the .05 level. The results for my main control variable, female 
labor force participation, also behave in similar ways across different lagged structures and dependent variables; it is negatively (and 
significantly) associated with increased conservative essentialist beliefs, while it is positively (albeit not significantly) associated with more 












CHAPTER 2: OPTIONAL FAMILISM AND EDUCATIONAL DIVIDES IN WORK-




Can policy alter deep-seated attitudes about work and family life? A recent policy shift in 
Germany on work-family arrangements provides a unique quasi-experimental setting for studying 
this question. In 2007, Germany began a reform program intended to boost mothers’ workforce 
participation, address demographic challenges, reduce skill shortages in the labor force, and cater to 
women voters (Morgan 2013). These reforms marked a departure from its historically traditionalist 
family policies favoring male breadwinner arrangements. Parental leave, previously two or more 
years long, was shortened to a year, while payment became tied to a mothers’ previous income. 
Subsidized public childcare became available, though unevenly across municipalities. At the same 
time, Germany left in place several elements of its historically “familist” policies like generous child 
allowances, three years of job protection for mothers, and joint taxation. 
This ‘layering-on’ of policies meant to incentivize mothers’ return to work alongside the 
persistence of more traditionalist policies is a configuration of family policies specific to continental 
Europe that has been termed ‘optional familism’ (Leitner 2003: 354). Optional familism is unique in 
that it does not promote a singular family model in the way that Scandinavian family policies support 
dual earner families or older policies preferred male breadwinning arrangements. Instead, it gives 
parents the option to use childcare facilities while also supporting families who decide to care for 
children at home.  
If the option to remain a full time carer or transition to a full-time worker is equally available 
to families, the question becomes: who decides to care and who decides to return to work? 
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Understanding the effects of family policies on work-family behavior requires considering how the 
same policies promote different behaviors for families at different class positions. From one 
perspective, the expansion of childcare and shortening of parental leave significantly increases the 
returns to work for highly mothers (Zoch 2020). But the continuation of work-reducing policies like 
joint taxation and child allowances may not similarly transform less-educated mothers’ incentive to 
engage in (full time) employment (Evertesson et al. 2009, Korpi et al. 2013, Morgan and Zippel 
2003). Especially because of the policy legacies encouraging full time caregiving for mothers, 
preferences for the relative balance of work and family likely also diverge, such that differently-
educated mothers make different decisions about their use of parental leave and childcare (Hakim 
2000, Kangas and Roostgard 2007).  
Because the post-reform German policy configuration yields different incentives and 
preferences for mothers at high and lower levels of education, I expect that the reforms led to 
greater educational polarization in family models. Highly educated mothers will be more likely to be 
in dual full-time families, while less educated mothers will remain in time and a half or male 
breadwinning arrangements. Existing work on these reforms provides only contradictory evidence. 
Geyer et al. (2014) find increases in employment among mostly lower educated mothers, while Zoch 
(2020) and Zoch and Hondralis (2018) find the reforms only increased employment among the 
highly educated.  
But no work yet has linked the reforms to class-based differences in work-family 
arrangements. Pre-reform, Hook (2015) finds the most common pattern of German work-family 
arrangements were male breadwinner or time and a half family models, with few differences across 
educational groups. By narrowly comparing those who became new parents before and the reforms, 
I seek to gain additional insight into how the reforms have shaped work-family arrangements.  
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I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, coupled with county-level 
administrative data on childcare availability, to assess how the policy reforms have shaped couple-
level earnings trajectories across reform periods. I compare new parents across three groups: pre-
reform, post-reform with low county-level childcare availability, and a second post-reform group of 
couples living in counties with high childcare availability. I use an event study model, previously used 
by Musick et al. (2020) to investigate cross-national differences in earnings’ trajectories, and apply it 
to this case. This allows me to compare mothers’ share of earnings pre and post-birth by both 
educational attainment and context. 
In absolute terms, post-reform college-educated mothers living in counties with high levels 
of childcare provision had more egalitarian work-family models than their pre-reform counterparts. 
These mothers return to earning between 40 and 50 % of household income several years after 
giving birth. In terms of work-family arrangements, these couples appear to be much closer to dual 
(full-time) earner couples than they resemble male breadwinner or time and a half arrangements that 
prevailed before the reforms. The same results did not hold for mothers in in counties with lower 
levels of childcare provision; college educated mothers’ earnings trajectories do not differ from the 
pre-reform period; these mothers continue to earn much lower levels of household income ranging 
between one quarter to one third of a households’ labor market earnings. 
Second, there is evidence of a divergence in work-family models between college and non-
college educated mothers. Relative to educational differences in a mothers earnings’ share in the pre-
reform period, the difference between college and non-college educated mothers’ share of earnings 
in counties with greater access to childcare is significant and substantial. This suggests that where the 
reforms were fully pursued, as measured by levels of childcare availability, there is evidence of a 
larger educational difference in work-family arrangements. Non-college educated mothers continue 
to be relatively constrained in their share of earnings, which amount to between a quarter to a third 
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of household income, whereas college-educated mothers earn fully half of household income in 
these counties. By contrast, cross-educational differences in counties with lower childcare availability 
are not statistically significantly different from the pre-reform period. 
The results suggest that a new pattern of family arrangements has emerged in Germany that 
is context dependent, and point to the critical nature of childcare availability in shaping couples’ 
earnings inequality. Where childcare availability has become extensive, families of higher-educated 
mothers appear to have become more gender egalitarian in their earnings, which has important 
consequences for a number of other (gendered) behaviors. Conversely, historical patterns of work-
family arrangements prevail in counties where childcare expansion was not pursued. The ways in 
which these new family policies shape families – by offering families choices as to how they 
reconcile work and care – has generated an educational divide.  
At first glance, the turn to optional familism and support for diverse family models seems to 
be transformative. For example, the reforms affirm a family’s right to care (Knijn and Kremer 1997) 
and provides the financial means for either parent to remain out of the workforce. But in the face of 
historically traditionalist policies, these policies also reaffirm gender inequalities. In doing so, these 
reforms actually point to strands of continuity with the Conservative welfare model. Specifically, the 
reforms create a new version of status preservation and reproduction that has been the historical 
basis for welfare policy in continental Europe. The childcare reforms facilitate highly educated 
mothers’ return to the workforce while the parental leave benefit maintains their income for the 
period they are on leave. For less-educated mothers, the incentives embedded in the mix of work-
enabling and work-reducing policies preserves their status as caregivers first, and workers second. 
This status preservation is de-gendered, but only insofar as it is biased towards those with 
competitive labor market skills. Since the reforms were passed, the optional familism provision has 
only been strengthened through other reforms in 2013. Therefore, German family policy should not 
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be seen as moving towards the Scandinavian model. Instead, it should be seen as a new form of the 
Continental welfare state.  
Education and Couples’ Earnings Inequality 
Class, and education specifically, shape a number of outcomes associated with mothers’ 
workforce participation, earnings equality, and the gendered division of labor in the home 
(Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook 2015, Korpi et al. 2013, Petit and Hook 2009, Steiber et al. 2016). So 
how does education shape work-family arrangements? This question begins with decisions about 
when and how many children to have. Brehm (2020) finds that highly educated mothers in Germany 
tend to have children in quicker succession to one another, facilitating their return to paid work. 
Less educated mothers tend to continue to have children for longer periods of time, prolonging the 
time they spend out of the labor force, which deepens the long-term consequences for their 
earnings.  
After childbirth, education is a key predictor of mothers’ labor force participation, such that 
highly educated women are more likely to be employed (Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook 2015, Korpi et 
al. 2013, Petit and Hook 2009, Steiber et al. 2016). From a classic economic perspective, higher 
returns to paid work imply greater (opportunity) cost of remaining out. From a sociological & 
attitudinal perspective, those with higher levels of education have are more likely to be oriented 
towards the labor market and more accepting of non-traditional gender roles (Crompton and 
Lyonette 2005, Hakim 2000). These predictions are generally borne out. Mothers with higher levels 
of educational attainment are more likely to participate in the labor market, do so full-time, and have 
shorter interruptions around childbirth in ways that reinforce their earnings and position on the 
labor market (Esping-Andersen 2009, Evertesson et al. 2009). Lower educated mothers have lower 




But most comparative research on the effects of parenthood and family policies often 
focuses on individual outcomes. Considerable research shows there is a long-lasting, negative impact 
on mothers’ working hours, wages, and career trajectories resulting from career interruptions and 
care demands from motherhood (England et al. 2016, Hook and Paek 2020, Morrissey 2017, Musick 
et al. 2020, Weishaar 2018). On top of this, some work shows that there is a fatherhood wage 
premium associated with parenthood for men (Killewald 2013, Glauber 2018). In reality, these 
changes in family dynamics should be considered relative to one another. After accounting for a 
mothers’ own preferences and potential labor market returns, decisions like whether to enter or 
leave the workforce are driven by partner-level characteristics like income, working hours, and 
gender attitudes (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). Mothers therefore face competing “income” and 
“opportunity cost” effects with regard to participation in the labor market. An income effect exists 
because despite their own labor market power, women with high-earning partners are more likely to 
opt-out of the labor market (Alper 2019). The opportunity cost perspective holds that the primary 
motivator for labor market decisions is a function of education and skill (England et al. 2012). 
Overall, mothers’ education is associated with greater equality in earnings, because highly 
educated women have higher rates of employment, working hours, and wages, which is also 
reflected in more egalitarian gender attitudes and orientation towards the labor market. As 
educational assortative mating has increased over time, highly educated mothers are increasingly 
likely to be in relationships with greater equality in earnings (Hook 2015, Klesment and Van Bavel 
2017, Steiber et al. 2016). 
Understanding gender earnings inequality is important, as it is a proximate causal factor 
undergirding other gendered couple-level dynamics. While mothers’ inclusion in the labor market 
constituted the first half of the gender revolution, how they fare on the labor market shapes the 
extent to which the revolution extends into the home. Women’s share of earnings shapes the ability 
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of women to advocate for greater equality in the sharing of housework and childcare responsibilities 
(Brines 1994, Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010), and ability and propensity to exit a relationship 
(Hobson 1990, Sayer and Bianchi 2000). 
The Role of Context 
While there is a consistent educational difference in mothers’ labor market outcomes and 
couples’ earnings inequality, the magnitude of the educational effect varies across countries and 
institutional contexts (Drasch 2013, England et al. 2012, Evertesson et al. 2009, Korpi et al. 2013). 
The configuration of welfare state policies and income inequality give rise to different outcomes 
across educational groups (Hook 2015, Hook and Paek 2020). Income inequality leads to variations 
in the educational returns to paid work, such that in the context of higher income inequality, higher 
educated mothers’ returns to work are greater than in countries with lower levels of income 
inequality. Welfare state policies generate different incentives for mothers of different educational 
backgrounds to engage in paid work (England et al. 2012, Evertesson et al. 2009, Hook and Paek 
2020, Korpi et al. 2013, Misra et al. 2011). Importantly, they also set norms around mother and 
fatherhood in ways that shape attitudes and behavior (Sjöberg 2004, Jozwiak 2021). 
High levels of defamilization, or the extent to which care burdens are removed from 
families, specifically mothers, are associated with higher levels of women’s labor force participation 
and greater prevalence of dual-earner families (Hook 2015). Shorter but better paid parental leaves, 
which were instituted with the reforms, encourage workforce re-entry. More important, though, is 
the availability of (subsidized) childcare for young children when parental leave entitlements expire 
(Nelson and Stephens 2013). Childcare provision shortens the duration of mothers’ work 
interruptions (Zoch and Hondralis 2018) and increases the probability of labor force re-entry 
(Bauernschuster and Schlotter 2015, Pettit and Hook 2009, see Morrissey 2017 for a review). 
Because of its universal design, the provision of childcare services, combined with an expanded 
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public service sector, increases mothers’ overall employment (Misra et al. 2011). Moreover, these 
policies are associated with greater compression of outcomes by education and class (Hook 2015, 
Mandel and Seymonov 2005, Mandel and Shalev 2009),  
By contrast, policies that familize care responsibilities depress women’s workforce 
participation, resulting in greater earnings inequality and the prevalence of time and a half and male 
breadwinner families. By placing care burdens on mothers, these policies reinforce gender 
inequalities both in the workplace and at home (Kleider 2015, Petit and Hook 2009). Long unpaid 
leaves disincentivize workforce return, joint taxation increases the marginal tax rate paid on a second 
income, and substantial financial support for families with children (through the tax system and 
child allowances) act as income replacement for paid work (Jaumotte 2003, Korpi et al. 2013, 
Morgan and Zippel 2003) but reinforce gender inequality (Jacobs and Gerson 2004, Petit and Hook 
2009). 
German Reforms in Context 
Where does Germany sit? Prior to reforms, German family and social policy was geared at 
supporting a single (male) earner family (Leitner 2008, Saraceno and Keck 2010, Morgan 2013). 
Parental leave entitlements were first introduced in 1986, with successive extensions that increased 
the duration of leaves, ultimately up to three years after a child’s birth. The parental leave benefit 
was a low, flat rate paid regardless of a mothers’ employment history. A general lack of services 
provided to families – most notably childcare – combined with part time schooling for young 
children placed care burdens on families. While childcare for 3-6 year olds is and has been more 
widely available, take-up rates remained comparatively low. In 1995, Bauernschuster and Schlotter 
(2015) found enrollment rates of 90% for 5-6 year, 60% of 4 year olds, but only 30% of three year 
olds. Since 1996, there has been an entitlement to care for 3-5 year olds (Rechtsanspruch auf einen 
Kindergartenplatz), but until 2008 little support for families with children under three years.  
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Long leaves and a lack of childcare, combined with generous child benefits, resulted in 
Germany having some of the lowest labor force participation rate of mothers. Consequently, Hook’s 
(2015) analysis reveals the dominant work-family arrangement in Germany before the reforms was a 
male breadwinner or time and a half arrangement, with only small differences across educational 
groups. 
Table 2.1: German Family Policy Reforms 
  Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
Change 
24 month leave benefit 
at 300 euros/month; 
shorter option available. 
Children born after 1 January 
2007: 12 month leave benefit 
at 67-100% of previous 
earnings; flat rate available for 
non-employed mothers. Two 
fathers’ months. 
Little private or public 
childcare. 
2008 childcare reforms leading 
to 2013 entitlement to 




36 month unpaid, job protected leave 
Joint Taxation 
Child Tax Benefits and Allowances 
 
Parents with children born as of 1 January 2007 became entitled to a shorter, 12 month leave that 
was now paid in relation to previous earnings (67-100% of previous pay up to 1800 euros). Parents 
with no employment history were still entitled to the old 300 euro per month flat-rate payment. In 
addition, there was a separate provision for fathers; two additional ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ months are 
reserved for the second parent with the same income-related benefit.  
The 2008 Child Welfare Act (Kinderförderungsgesetz) put in place an entitlement (as of 2013) for 
children above the age of one to a place in formal childcare. The implementation of this law varied 
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widely; states and municipalities had significant discretion over its implementation. Some places, 
particularly those in the East with a robust childcare infrastructure found no problem meeting 
demand. Variations in the strength of left-wing government, maternal employment, and Catholic 
legacies at the local level determined the speed of implementation of the new law elsewhere 
(Andronescu and Carnes, 2015, Busemeyer and Steitzl 2018). Supply in many areas was so 
constrained that by 2014, the attendance rate for children under three was only 27% in West 
Germany (Geyer et al. 2014). 
These reforms were pursued for several reasons: to increase skills on the German labor 
market, combat demographic decline by making it easier to combine work and family, to encourage 
the labor force participation of mothers, and to cater to women voters (Morgan 2013). While first 
introduced by the Red/Green coalition in the 2000s, they were not passed until the Grand Coalition 
came to power. The direction of reforms was contested because of traditional factions of the 
CDU/CSU that favored continued strong support for traditional family arrangements. As such, the 
option to pursue a fully Scandinavian model could was not ultimately available to reformers. The 
resulting set of policies combining elements of traditional policies like child benefits, joint taxation, 
and long unpaid leaves with childcare and generous parental leave payments and is ultimately a 
reflection of politics – in particular the importance of Christian Democracy (Huber and Stephens, 
2001) and changing welfare state coalitions (Häusermann 2018).    
Rather than eliminating older policies, these reforms represented a “layering” on top of 
older, more traditionalist, policies. Post-reform German family policy resembled neither the typical 
familist and traditionalist model of the past, nor did it resemble the universalist and more egalitarian 
Scandinavian model. Instead, it combined high levels of support for familist policies while adding 
defamilizing policies that expanded childcare and the public service sector. This configuration, also 
known as ‘optional familism,’ is a relatively recent emergence in continental Europe. Leitner (2003: 
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359) describes this configuration as one in which, “the family’s right to care [is] not equated with the 
family’s obligation to care.”  
If the reforms equally facilitate full time caring and employment, then an important question 
is who makes the decision to remain a full-time carer, and who decides or is able to work full-time. 
The expansive literature on the interaction of social policy and class can shed light on this question. 
One issue is that the expectations of outcomes produced by (de)familizing policies somewhat 
contradict one another. The effects of these policies are often analyzed as separate constructs that in 
most contexts do not overlap and interact with one another. But under optional familism, 
(de)familizing policies exist at high levels at the same time, with potentially different consequences 
for how they affect mothers at different class positions.   
A plethora of findings suggest that defamilizing policies like childcare and shorter parental 
leaves support the formation of dual earner families, especially among mothers with less than a 
college education (Hook 2015, Korpi et al. 2013, Steiber et al. 2013). The creation of a larger public 
sector facilitates employment, while the universal and egalitarian design of the programs encourages 
their use across social class. Defamilization, where it exists alone, should therefore also compress 
educational stratification of work-family arrangements. By contrast, familizing policies, which 
include transfers and payments to families, are generally work-reducing and reinforce gender 
inequality (Petit and Hook 2009, Hook 2015). But they are more likely to do so for those with 
middling and lower levels of education than for the college-educated (Korpi et al. 2013).  
In the context of optional familism, Hook (2015) expects that the income replacement 
offered by these policies outweighs the incentives to engage in (more) paid employment for middle 
and lower-educated mothers, producing polarizing patterns of work-family arrangements by class. I 
extend this argument to more broadly argue that the shift to optional familism presented 
fundamentally different options to mothers with different levels of education. First, the economic 
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incentives to engage in paid (full time) work differ by education, but also differ according to the 
degree to which policies facilitate the reconciliation of paid work and childcare needs. Second, 
workforce participation and work-family arrangements are also dependent to some degree on 
individual’s preferences. The policy changes, because they allowed for parental choice, facilitated the 
expression of (previously incongruent) preferences, particularly among highly-educated mothers. But 
the policy changes themselves also shaped preferences, orienting more mothers towards the labor 
market.  
Education and Returns to Paid Work 
The German reforms significantly altered the opportunity costs to employment versus 
staying home and contained significant labor market activating mechanisms. The new earnings-
related structure of the parental leave benefit benefited higher earning mothers by provided more 
continuous income in the year following childbirth, as compared to the older, poorly paid flat-rate 
benefit. Second, the sooner expiration of the parental leave benefit resulted in shorter work 
interruptions and smaller decline in skills and earnings normally associated with motherhood (Ziefle 
and Gangl 2014, Morgan and Zippel 2003). But for mothers who were marginally or not employed, 
the income replacement received under the new scheme may have changed or be lower than the 
payment from the previous flat-rate benefit. 
More consequential is the effect of childcare, because affordable and accessible childcare 
alleviates time pressures and increases the opportunity cost of remaining out of the labor force. This 
is true regardless of educational attainment, though the relative gains for highly educated women are 
larger than for mothers those with lower earnings potential. Highly educated mothers with access to 
childcare were more likely to return to full-time employment (Zoch 2020), which increases their 
earnings relative to their partners’ earnings much more so than part time or marginal employment. 
Because childcare generates higher returns to work for highly educated mothers, they are more likely 
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to use it, resulting in a “Matthew effect,” whereby the most educated parents are more likely to use 
public childcare to otherwise outsource care responsibilities. While disadvantaged children benefit 
more from and might be expected to be more likely to use public and subsidized childcare, Pavolini 
and Van Lancker (2018) show lower levels of participation in formal childcare among disadvantaged 
families. 
Welfare States, Education, and Work-Family Preferences 
Beyond their different returns to work, mothers at different class positions also have 
different preferences over how the social policy addresses parenthood. An extensive literature 
connects welfare state policies to citizens’ attitudes, vote behavior, and party politics (Garritzmann et 
al. 2018, Gingrich and Häsermann 2015, Häusermann 2018). As labor market returns to education 
have increased, highly educated individuals tend to support policies that benefit them, in particular 
social investment policies that facilitate their employment and future earnings. By contrast, less-
educated individuals are more supportive of policies that compensate (for losses in income). Because 
optional familism provides high levels of both sets of policies, preferences may diverge substantially 
across educational groups. This appears to be the case; Table 2 shows differences by education in 
preference for the provider of childcare, with substantially more ‘traditional’ preferences among the 
less educated.  This divide is also evident in gender attitudes and preferences for leave durations (see 
Appendix).  
Table 2.2: Educational Differences in Childcare Preferences 
2012 ISSP 










Government  85% 82% 43% 31% 
Family  7% 12% 43% 52% 
      
Note: Other options (no shown) included: non-profits, private care, employer. 
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Education also shapes preferences towards work-family arrangements Mothers’ decisions to 
enter or leave the workforce depended on couples’ preferences towards the division of labor and 
separation of work and care spheres (Hakim 2000, Khoudja and Fleischmann 2018). College-
educated individuals are more likely to prefer more egalitarian divisions of household and paid labor 
(Usdansky 2011). College educated mothers are more likely to give birth to a second child earlier, 
speeding up the process of workforce return, while for less educated mothers the periods between 
births tend to be longer, lengthening the associated labor market penalties (Brehm 2020).   
These preferences are inseparable from the structure of the policies themselves, making 
untangling the relationship between societal attitudes and policy difficult (Pfau-Efinger 2005). From 
one perspective, German family policy simply caught up or recalibrated to accommodate the 
preferences of highly educated mothers, while leaving intact the historical ‘pathway’ for more 
traditional parents. From another perspective, the reforms themselves also have been repeatedly 
shown to have also altered societal norms towards working mothers (Zoch and Schober 2017, 
Wrohlich and Unterhofer 2017). But because of the turn to optional familism, there is evidence 
these preferences remain relatively more conservative, especially among less-educated mothers. For 
lower-educated mothers who did not work or who were less oriented towards paid work, the 
reforms may have had little consequences on their preferences or attitudes 
Greater educational polarization in mothers’ labor market fortunes can therefore be 
expected where family policies create different incentives across socio-economic groups. There are 
two mechanisms at play. The structure of the policies after reforms increase the returns to work for 
highly educated women and the opportunity cost of remaining a full-time caregiver, such that their 
behavior (and outcomes) diverge from less educated mothers. Second, while there is a complex 
relationship between culture, policy, and attitudes, differences in preferences for work-family 
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arrangements and policies associated with education similarly facilitate a larger educational gap in 
outcomes. 
To summarize, the policy changes should be expected to do two things. First, they should 
lead to greater earnings equality for college-educated mothers. But because they should not similarly 
transform work-family arrangements for less-educated mothers, the reforms should result in greater 
educational polarization of family types.  
Data & Methods 
The bulk of the data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an annual 
household database dating to 1984. The data includes yearly information for all members of the 
household, including income, working hours, employment status, education, and fertility histories. 
The dependent variable, women’s share of household income, is calculated as the ratio of women’s 
gross labor market income to that of the household. Educational status was recoded such that a one 
indicates women with a tertiary degree (ISCED codes 5 and 6), and a 0 for all other degrees.  
Information on county-level childcare availability was collected from the Regional Statistical 
Offices of the Federal States and attached to respondents’ households for each year the data are 
available (beginning in 2007). Ideally, one would have measures of the availability of childcare spots 
in each county, but the only available statistics are of the usage of childcare facilities, which has been 
used in other studies as proxies for availability (Zoch 2020). I use this to calculate the childcare ratio, 
or the number of children under three years old in public childcare facilities as a share of the number 
of children under three years old in a given county and year. For each year, I then calculate if a 
county has above (1) or below (0) median childcare coverage. SOEP respondents are assigned to a 
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high childcare area if their county has above-median childcare availability in the three years after 
birth, when the availability of childcare for under-threes is likely most relevant to that couple.1 
Because the institutional legacies of motherhood and childcare arrangements in the former 
the GDR, this study only focuses on West Germany mothers who are married or live with partners. 
I collect information on couples’ earnings dynamics from two years before a childbirth until eight 
years afterwards. The final sample includes 6,142 observations of 942 native-born German mothers 
between 18 and 50 who gave birth between 1999 and 2018 and are seen at least twice in the data. 
I account for context by creating two ‘treatment’ variables. The first accounts for whether 
mothers gave birth to their first child before or after the 2007 parental leave reforms. The second 
treatment variable accounts for childcare availability for under-threes, which is only available 
beginning in 2007. The second treatment variable includes three groups: 0 is assigned to pre-reform 
mothers, 1 indicates a respondent lives in a county with low levels of childcare in the three years 
after birth, and 2 indicates that respondents live in countries with high levels of childcare provision 
Methods 
I follow Musick et al.’s (2020) approach to assessing women’s income as a share of the 
household income following childbirth using an event study model. This modelling strategy uses a 
within (fixed-effects) estimator to estimate changes in mothers’ earnings share in the years before 















                                               
1 Theoretically, a mother giving birth before the parental leave reform could take advantage of expanded childcare in a 
child’s remaining years under three years old. As a check, I also include pre-reform mothers in the childcare groups, 
though the results do not substantially differ from the results presented below.  
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Where Y is the annual share of household gross income earned by women (before taxes and 
transfers). D is a variable, or counter, running from -2 before childbirth to 8 years after childbirth. 
Educational differences are measured by Ei, an indicator variable for high or low educational 
attainment. The Pre/post variable is Pi, which takes on a value of one in the post-reform period. In 
alternative specifications, a variable Mi is substituted for the pre/post variable capturing whether a 
county was above or below the yearly median for childcare availability. X1it are fixed effects for age 
and X2it for year to account for the fluctuations in the effects of motherhood conditional on age and 
year. 
The primary effect of interest is the three-way interaction between the counter, education, 
and this second treatment variable (pre-period, low childcare Kreis, and high childcare Kreis). In 
successive models, I include the following time-variant controls: second birth (M1), a husband’s 
labor market characteristics (M2), employment status (M3), and working hours (M4), each of which 
accounts for different explanations for changes in couples’ earnings dynamics. The Appendix shows 
descriptive figures of the changes in each of the control variables for each pre and post-birth year. 
Results 
Figure 1 presents the descriptive changes in mothers’ share of earnings among couples who 
had children before and after the German family policy reforms were enacted (by mothers’ 
educational attainment). Before couples have their first child, there is some gender inequality in 
earnings, but the difference is small when compared to the effect parenthood has on earnings 
inequality. Consistent with extensive literature on motherhood penalties and household changes 
associated with parenthood, this changes dramatically when couples become parents.  In the year 
during and following the birth of a first child, mothers’ incomes as a share of household income 
drop dramatically, and only recover very slowly in the years following a first childbirth. Eight years 
 
 60 
after giving birth to their first child, mothers only earn between a fifth and a third of household 
income.  
However, the descriptive results suggest there are important differences across educational 
groups and reform periods. The declines are steepest for women who gave birth under the old 
regime and those without a college degree. In the pre-reform period and across educational groups, 
mothers’ incomes decline sharply after birth and remain depressed for years after a first childbirth.  
Importantly, these declines for college educated mothers are largely statistically insignificantly 
different from mothers without a college education, suggestive of the ways in which pre-reform 
German family policy strongly preferred family models with a single primary earner and a marginal 
secondary earner. In the post-reform period, differences across educational groups emerge. College-
educated mothers in the post-reform group saw their incomes recover more quickly after childbirth 
and earned larger shares of household income, approaching one third of household income. Non-
college educated mothers fared slightly better under the new policies, but still earned significantly 
lower shares of household income than their college educated counterparts, only approaching about 












Figure 2.1: Descriptive Data of Earnings’ Trajectories 
 
Couples’ Earnings Inequality Before and After Reforms: Event Study Analysis 
The central question of this paper is to what extent the reforms reshaped the gendered 
division of income for couples with different educational attainments. To investigate this first 
question, Figure 2 shows results from the first set of fixed-effects regression models. These compare 
women’s earnings before and after birth interacted with a pre-post indicator variable indicating 
whether or not the couple had their first child before or after the reforms came into effect for 
children born since January 2007, with fixed effects for year and age (N = 6,143 of 942 couples). 
Because the results are more easily interpretable by figures than tables, I present a series of figures 
and include the full regression outputs in the Appendix. The figures presented below show the 
predicted values from the event study models for each of the years, both before and after birth. In 
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each case, T=2 is the year in which mothers gave birth to their first child. Each line in the models 
represents a different subpopulation being analyzed.  
Figure 2.2: Event Study Baseline Model, Pre- and Post-Reform 
 
The results show striking differences across reform periods and educational groups. In the 
pre-reform group, mothers’ earnings decline after birth and remain lower than their pre-birth levels, 
which holds across college and non-college educated mothers. The group that stands out are college 
educated mothers who gave birth after the reforms. Couples with college-educated mothers tended 
to have less earnings inequality in the years following childbirth, and their share of earnings many 
years after childbirth tend to more closely resemble their pre-birth division of household income. By 
contrast, every other group, including couples with less than college education had similar 




This shows initial evidence that, at least as couples earnings dynamics are concerned, the reforms did 
result in a larger educational gap. Specifically, couples with non-college educated mothers closely 
resemble the pre-reform German model of a primary male breadwinner and a secondary female 
earner, with significant gender gaps in couples’ earnings. By contrast, highly educated couples more 
closely resemble a family pattern more common among Scandinavian families, with two full time 
earners (and carers). But, they also resemble patterns of highly educated mothers in liberal countries, 
like the United States, where there is similar educational polarization of work-family arrangements. 
Analysis With Childcare Data 
To assess to what extent these changes are associated with changes in parental leave and 
childcare availability, I move to a second set of models that contain multiple treatment groups 
conditional on childcare availability. While mothers who gave birth after January 2007 were newly 
entitled to a year of leave at higher pay, there was great internal variation in Germany in terms of 
their access to the second important component of the reforms, subsidized childcare. Even with 
shortened leaves that encourage workforce re-entry, couples without access to (full-time) childcare 
might curtail mothers’ ability to participate in (full-time) employment, with a cascading series of 
consequences for their earnings and couples’ earnings inequality. 
The next sets of analyses compare couples’ earnings dynamics conditional on whether or not 
they lived in counties with high levels of childcare availability when their first child was under three 
years old, as the effect of childcare on women’s return to work and earnings is concentrated in those 
early post-birth years and after leave entitlements expire. 
I also directly test the hypothesis that the educational gap in couples’ earnings inequality will 
rise with the shortening of parental leave and expansion of childcare, because these policies might 
privilege college-educated mothers with greater labor market returns. It is important to note that a 
larger educational divide in mothers’ share of earnings might not be normatively desirable, even if it 
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is a likely outcome. In fact, a small educational gap coupled with an equivalent post-reform boost in 
earnings’ share for all mothers is likely preferred. In the following results, we can examine whether 
changes to mothers’ earning share are driven by increases in college-educated mothers’ employment 
or by a combination of college and non-college educated mothers. 
Figure 2.3: Comparing Pre-Period and Counties with High Childcare Usage 
 
Figure 3 shows mothers’ predicted shares of earnings for each of the years before and after 
birth compared to the pre-reform period. The immediate difference of note is that college educated 
mothers’ share of household income remains significantly higher than any other group, differences 
which in most years are statistically significantly different from both college-educated mothers in the 
pre-period and non-college educated mothers in the post-reform high childcare group. Couples with 
college-educated mothers in these counties seem to have very low levels of earnings inequality, 
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approaching nearly half of household earnings in later post-birth years. Their earnings trajectory is 
much more in line with that of a dual (full-time) earner family type model than any other group. 
Importantly, none of the interactions with the counter (year before and after birth) are significant, 
indicating that the post-reform groups are subject to a similarly-shaped penalty for each year 
compared to pre-birth years. 
For non-college educated mothers, the difference in their share of earnings compared to the 
pre-reform period is only statistically significantly higher at T=4 and 5, but those differences become 
insignificant in later post-birth years. This period corresponds to the time when pre-reform mothers 
likely would otherwise have been on parental leave. While non-college educated mothers’ earnings 
inequality might initially recover more quickly after birth, their overall earnings trajectories are not 
significantly altered in counties with high levels of childcare usage. Their predicted earnings remain 
low, between a quarter and a third of household earnings, more consistent with a time and a half 
family model that has historically been prevalent.  
Comparing the overall results to one another, the difference between highly educated and 
less educated couples’ earnings trajectories in high childcare counties post-reforms are statistically 
different from one another in all years after birth. By comparison, in the pre-reform period, 
educational differences in earnings are not statistically distinguishable. Next, I examine the reform 
group (pre or post with high childcare) by education differences in predicted earnings share. The 
difference between educational groups is larger (0.201 at T=4, p<0.01) and statistically significant 
when comparing the high childcare counties to mothers who gave birth pre-reforms (See the first 
row of Table 2 for results across a range of post-birth years).  
This is evidence that – at least in the counties with greater childcare availability – the reforms 
led to wider educational disparities in couple’s earnings inequality. Before the reforms, all mothers 
experienced similar earnings inequality and trajectories after birth that are consistent with a single 
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earner with a part time earner model. Post-reform, highly educated mothers’ households more 
closely resemble dual-full time earner ‘types,’ while for less educated mothers it resembles the 
historically-prevalent time and a half model. 
Figure 2.4: Comparing Pre and Counties with Low Childcare Usage 
 
There are no substantial differences when comparing mothers’ predicated share of earnings 
between the pre-reform group and post-reform, low childcare counties. The range of predicated 
earnings shares is much narrower, and differences across subgroups are generally not statistically 
significant from one another. Moreover, the educational by reform period differences (the difference 
in difference of educational gap by reform group) compared in mothers’ earnings do not statistically 
differ from one another (See Table 2). In other words, the educational gap did not grow in these 




While the point estimates for couples with a college-educated mother are higher, their share 
of earnings does not significantly differ from pre-reform college educated mothers. Moreover, the 
estimates suggest that college-educated couples still experience significant earnings inequalities in 
this context. At their lowest post birth at T=6, these mothers earn a 24.6% of household income, 
and the highest point at T-9 is 34% of household income, which more closely approximates a time 
and a half earner model, as compared to college-educated couples in high childcare counties, where 
these couples earned roughly equal shares of earnings that resembled dual-earner models. Lastly, the 
lower precision of the estimates for college-educated mothers in counties with lower childcare 
availability is potentially the result of a small sample (N =482 of 71 couples).  
Lastly, do counties of high childcare provision differ in their educational gaps from counties 
of low childcare provision? An educational gap in the post-reform counties would provide some 
additional evidence that the expansion of childcare is the critical policy instrument driving changes 
in mothers’ share of earnings. A tentative answer is that there is that the average difference in 
mothers’ earnings in the counties with high levels of childcare usage is higher than the educational 
gap in mothers’ earnings in counties with lower levels of childcare usage. The differences are 
significant at the 0.10 level, and results for a full set of models is shown in the Appendix Table 2.7, 
and a figure of the baseline results is in the Appendix Figure 2.5. The lack of estimate precision is 
again perhaps the result of the smaller sample of college-educated mothers in counties with lower 
levels of childcare usage. Moving across models, these differences do become statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level when considering differences in second births, fathers’ employment status and 
fathers’ logged earnings.  
What accounts for these changes? 
The previous models show the results based on baseline models without accounting for 
several other factors that might shape couples’ earnings inequity. For example, changes in couples’ 
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earnings inequality resulting from the reforms could be due to changes in fertility patterns, changes 
to male employment, and changes to women’s employment and wages. In fact, the expected effect 
and intention behind the reforms was to increase mothers’ labor force participation. Marginal 
increases in employment after birth, especially if it happens sooner after a childbirth, might result in 
smaller penalties relative to her share of earnings before childbirth. Moreover, educational 
differences in employment differences are to be expected, as previous research on these reforms has 
found the effects on employment to be highest among highly educated mothers (Zoch 2020, Zoch 
and Hondralis 2018).  
To examine which components of couples’ labor market behavior drive the changes in 
couples’ earnings dynamics, I estimate subsequent models which include controls for mothers’ 
employment status, and present again the predicted probabilities of mothers’ share of household 
earnings. I follow Musick et al. (2020) in also estimating models that successively build on one 
another, including indicators for second childbirths (M1), plus husband’s gross logged labor earnings 
and employment status (M2), plus her employment (M3), and a mothers’ working hours (M4). 
Table 2.3: Context by Education Differences in Mothers’ Share Income 
  Context by Education Differences in Mothers’ Earnings Share 
 High CC Low CC 
  +2 +5 +8 +2 +5 +8 
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Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the predicted share of women's earnings 
by educational group for each of the treatment groups, relative to the pre-reform group. The numbers in 
parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come from post-estimation 
commands (lincom) in STATA. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2 shows the difference in mothers’ predicted share of earnings between educational 
groups for low and high childcare counties compared to the education-based difference in earnings’ 
share in the pre-reform era for each model specification. The first three columns show this 
difference in predicted earnings for counties with high levels of childcare provision. The difference 
in the post-birth years shown here is statistically significant, which in substantive terms means the 
educational gap in earnings’ share is higher in counties with greater access to childcare as compared 
to the reform period.  
Moving across models helps to better understand which components of a couples’ economic 
characteristics help account for this difference. Model 1 adds second births, which somewhat 
reduces the estimates (though the difference in models is not significant), perhaps because most 
mothers have a second birth during the observation window. Model 2 adds to this model fathers’ 
characteristics (employment status and logged earnings), which actually increases the difference in 
estimates, gap. Model 3, which adds mothers’ year to year employment status significantly reduces 
these estimates, rendering the differences not significant two years after her first childbirth and 
renders the last estimate significant only at the 0.10 level. Moreover, the point estimates are 
substantially reduced, suggesting variations in employment status pre and post reform account for 
much of the change in the educational divide. Adding her working hours, which Model 4 does, 
further brings the estimates of the educational divide in earnings share across reform periods closer 
to zero. This is illustrative evidence that differences in mothers’ employment post birth account for 
a substantial proportion of the growing educational gap in counties with greater access to childcare. 
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A similar pattern is not found when comparing counties with low childcare availability to the 
pre-reform period. Moving across the models for counties with lower than median levels of 
childcare availability, in no case is the difference in mothers’ earnings before the reforms between 
college and non-college educated mothers significantly different from the educational gap in 
mothers’ share of earnings after the reforms. In other words, the educational gap in couples’ 
earnings inequality in regions with less childcare provision is statistically the same compared to the 
pre-reform period. This, coupled with the previous results, has important implications for earnings’ 
inequality. In the first set of analyses, mothers’ share of earnings in these counties were lower in 
absolute terms, hovering between a quarter and a third of household income even eight years after 
birth. This suggests the context of lower childcare availability limits’ mothers’ earnings potential and 
results in patterns of work-family arrangements more consistent with historically familistic policies. 
Finally, the effects seem particularly limiting for mothers with a college degree, as their earnings 
share increased dramatically in counties with higher levels of childcare availability. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In Hook’s (2015) cross-national examination of work-family patterns across educational 
divides, she hypothesized that the particular configuration of family policies enabling “optional 
familism” would be associated with significant educational polarization in family models. This study 
puts this hypothesis to the test within the German case, where historically familist policies were 
supplemented with provisions meant to enable women’s greater involvement in paid work, resulting 
in greater flexibility for how parents combine work and care.  
The German reforms did two things at roughly the same time: they shortened parental leave 
and expanded availability of childcare for under threes, which was previously non-existent. Because 
of the uneven nature of the expansion of childcare across German counties, these reforms offer a 
unique opportunity to examine the consequences of either reform on couples’ earnings inequality 
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after birth. The results suggest that the effects are attributable to the expansion of childcare spots for 
children under three years old. There is no evidence to suggest that changes to parental leave led to 
any significant differences in mothers’ share of earnings. 
Importantly, there is also little evidence that the reforms reduced the relative earnings 
penalty associated with motherhood. There is no difference in the penalty associated with 
motherhood in individual years after childbirth; instead, there is simply a general effect attributable 
to being a college educated mother in a county with high levels of childcare availability.  
Second, the results point to a widening educational divide in couples earnings’ inequality. In 
counties with high levels of childcare availability, the education-based difference compared to the 
pre-reform period, meaning that post-reform college-educated mothers earn much higher shares of 
household income compared to their less educated counterparts and college-educated mothers pre-
reform. The counties with high levels of childcare are those who expanded childcare to the greatest 
extent, and are the counties that best exemplify the ‘optional familist’ model to which Germany has 
transitioned. The prediction that optional familism leads to greater educational inequalities in 
outcomes, therefore, is largely borne out in Germany. 
Why did the reforms not significantly alter non-college educated mothers’ earnings 
trajectories after reform? There are several potential explanations. First, an unobservable 
characteristic that might mediate this relationship is the structure and availability of paid work for 
lower-educated mothers. Given the rise of feminized part time employment, it should not be 
surprising that greater levels of employment do not translate to substantial increases in earnings. 
Second, the historical legacy of familism and the way it has shaped patterns of gender attitudes and 
preferences for different types of social policy associated with parenthood might lead to selection 
into different arrangements after childbirth.  
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Recent updating to family policy in Germany has strengthened the provisions of family 
policy that encourage educational divides to emerge. Since the reforms of the 2000s, German family 
policy has strengthened policies that can be considered ‘optional familism.’ which. Two additional 
provisions, enacted after these reforms, allow more choice and flexibility as to how parents reconcile 
care and work. Since 2013, parents can opt for a childcare allowance paid directly to the family if 
they choose not to send their children to formal childcare. Meanwhile, some states offer higher than 
mandated child allowances that serve as income replacement for mothers’ income. Finally, from 
2015, parents may opt to take two years of leave at half the monthly pay, during which they are also 
allowed to work part time, potentially prolonging a return to full-time employment. 
Rather than reading off these results as evidence of a simple divide that falls along 
educational lines, this study reflects other work demonstrating how educational divides are reshaping 
European societies and politics. This paper shows that welfare states ‘secure’ families in ways that 
are patterned by the interaction of gender and class. Historically, continental welfare states policies 
were aimed at status preservation when risk events like sickness, unemployment, and old age 
occurred. Parenthood – a new social risk – was historically not covered because of the welfare states’ 
reliance on family care for children and the elderly. But the outcomes produced by these reforms are 
also status preserving, just this time in a gender-neutral way. College educated mothers’ earnings 
appear to be protected in the context where childcare availability has been expanded. The reforms 
preserve relatively privileged college-educated mothers’ ability to be full time workers. At the same 
time, their less-educated counterparts remain in their historical pattern of significant loss of earnings 
following the beginning of parenthood. As a whole, instead of encouraging gender egalitarian 
behaviors in the labor market and at home, the reforms seem to institutionalize a class/educational 
divide in gendered work-family arrangements, with consequential downstream implications for 
gender attitudes and gendered divisions of labor. 
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What are the implications for gender equality? The reforms reaffirm a family’s right to care 
for a young child without forcing care burdens upon mothers. This greater flexibility for family 
choice in work-family arrangements resonates with contemporary feminist discourses of choice that 
frames any decisions to remain at work or at home as feminist ones. But what is considered 
egalitarian is largely context dependent – evidence suggests the presence of familizing policies, even 
alongside defamilizing ones, still results in essentialist conceptions of gender norms, even if attitudes 
towards mothers in the workplace change (Jozwiak 2021). These multiple and competing images of 
what is ‘feminist’ and what is ‘egalitarian,’ formalized in policy, potentially undergirds the continued 
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Table 2.4: Educational Differences in Gender Attitudes  
2012 ISSP 
Response to Family Life Suffers if the Mother Works 
High Ed  Sweden Norway W. Germany France 
High Ed Mean  4.1 3.75 3.64 3.72 
Low Ed Mean  3.72 3.49 3.06 3.19 
Difference  0.38 0.26 0.58 0.53 
Response to Household is Wife's Job, a Husband's Is to Work 
High Ed  Sweden Norway W. Germany Austria 
High Ed Mean  4.54 4.43 4.36 3.79 
Low Ed Mean  4.21 4.05 3.5 3.09 
Difference  0.33 0.38 0.86 0.7 
Response to Being a Housewife is As Fulfilling As Working 
High Ed  Sweden Norway W. Germany Austria 
High Ed Mean  3.32 3.42 3.51 3.48 
Low Ed Mean  3.11 3.35 3 2.98 
Difference  0.21 0.07 0.51 0.5 
Response to What Women Really Want is a Home and Child 
High Ed Mean  3.93 3.94 4.17 3.77 
Low Ed Mean  3.47 3.55 3.43 3.14 
Difference  0.46 0.39 0.74 0.63 
Note: Survey weights applied      
 
Table 2.5: Leave Preferences 
High/Low Ed determined by Tertiary degree Yes/No (highest ISCED category) 
2012 ISSP 
Paid Leave Yes/No, How Long 
  Sweden Norway W. Germany Austria France 
High Ed  16.88 12.47 15.7 25.9 10.6 
Low Ed  16.58 12.7 16.3 28.8 13.8 
Difference   0.3 -0.23 -0.6 -2.9 -3.2 
 
 
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Women's Share Income 6,143 0.2389435 0.2503698 0 1 
Counter 6,143 4.495686 2.831466 0 10 
College Degree 6,143 0.3791307 0.4852102 0 1 
Age 6,143 32.86017 5.220643 18 50 
Year 6,143 2008.967 5.321451 1998 2018 
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2nd Birth 6,143 0.2503663 0.4332592 0 1 
Employed 6,143 0.6351945 0.4814148 0 1 
Hours Worked 6,054 18.53994 17.57946 0 50 
Log Man Income 6,143 8.022548 0.6231247 0 9.93487 
Partner's Employment 6,143 0.9544197 0.2085902 0 1 
Treatment 6,143 0.7634706 0.8591192 0 2 
Median Childcare 4,037 0.5536289 0.4971772 0 1 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Median Childcare Ratio by Year 
 
Note: The quantity plotted here is the median, for each year the data are available, of West German childcare usage rates, 
which are calculated as the proportion of under-threes in care relative to the population in a given county under three 




Figure 2.6: Post-Period, Comparison Between High and Low Childcare Usage  
 
 














Table 2.7: Educational Differences in Earnings’ Share Before and After Reforms 
Context by Education Differences 
High CC Low CC 
+2 +5 +8 +2 +5 +8 
0.201*** 0.284*** 0.243*** 0.045 0.137 0.037 
(0.049,0.352) (0.126, 0.442) (0.067, 0.418) (-0.137, 0.227) (-0.055, 0.329) (-0.179, 0.252) 
Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the predicted share of women's earnings by 
educational group for each of the treatment groups, relative to educational difference in pre-reform group. The numbers 
in parenthesis are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come from post-estimation 
commands (lincom) in STATA for the baseline model (M0). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 2.8: High and Low Childcare Comparisons of Educational Differences in Mothers’ Earnings 
Share 
Context by Education Differences 
 High vs Low Childcare 
  +2 +5 +8 
M0 0.155* 0.148 0.206* 
 (-0.030, 0.341) (-0.050, 0.345) (-0.024, 0.436) 
M1 0.14 0.147 0.203* 
 (-0.043, 0.322) (-0.478, 0.342) (-0.240, 0.431) 
M2 0.175** 0.215*** 0.284*** 
 (0.023, 0.326) (0.054, 0.375) (0.098, 0.471) 
M3 0.047 0.054 0.136** 
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 (-0.048, 0.141) (-0.046, 0.154) (0.020, 0.252) 
M4 0.002 0.024 0.091* 
  (-0.071, 0.077) (-0.055, 0.102) (0.000, 0.183) 
Note: The results show the difference in difference, or the difference in the 
predicted share of women's earnings by educational group for each of the 
treatment groups, relative to the pre-reform group. The numbers in parenthesis 
are the 95% confidence intervals around the point estimates. The results come 
from post-estimation commands (lincom) in STATA. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.9: Models with Quantities of Interest 
Mothers' Share Income  
  M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Treatment Group x College (Ref: Pre-Period)      
Low CC X College 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 
High CC x College 0.21* 0.19* 0.19* 0.05 0.00 
College Degree (Ref: No College) -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 
Second Birth  -0.10* -0.11* -0.02* -0.00 
Partner Income (Log)   -0.11* -0.10* -0.09* 
Partner Employment Status   -0.05* -0.05* -0.03* 
Employment Status    0.27* 0.10* 
Working Hours     0.01* 
Survey Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Age FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant 0.32 0.3 1.16 0.87 0.74 
R^2 Within 0.26 0.28 0.41 0.77 0.85 
R^2 Overall 0.13 0.16 0.28 0.7 0.83 
sigma_u 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.1 0.07 
sigma_e 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.07 
rho 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.52 
 
 
Table 2.10: Full Models at Post-Birth Times 
Mothers' Share Income  
  M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Counter (Ref: Two Years Pre Birth)      
-1 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 
0 -0.12* -0.12* -0.09* -0.02 0.01 
1 -0.31* -0.32* -0.27* -0.09* 0.02 
2 -0.28* -0.29* -0.23* -0.09* 0.02 
3 -0.22* -0.21* -0.16* -0.07* 0.03 
4 -0.18* -0.15* -0.09* -0.06* 0.03 
5 -0.16* -0.13* -0.05 -0.05 0.04 
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6 -0.13* -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 
7 -0.13 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 
8 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.04 
Counter at Low CC (Ref: Pre-Reform)      
-1 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
0 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09* -0.01 0.02 
1 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
2 0.10* 0.10* 0.02 0.00 0.02 
3 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 
4 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 
5 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 
6 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 
7 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 
8 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.05* 
Counter at High CC (Ref: Pre-Reform)      
-1 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
0 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06* -0.01 0.01 
1 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
2 0.11* 0.12* 0.06 0.03 0.03 
3 0.10* 0.09* 0.03 0.02 0.03 
4 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.03 
5 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
6 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
7 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
8 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 
Counter x College (Ref: No College)      
-1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 
1 0.07* 0.08* 0.06* 0.01 0.01 
2 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.02 0.01 
3 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 
4 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
5 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
6 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
7 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 
8 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Counter X High CC X College (Ref: Pre-Period)      
-1 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
0 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 
1 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 
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2 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
3 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
4 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
5 0.08 0.07 0.10* 0.08* 0.06* 
6 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 
7 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
8 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Counter X Low CC X College (Ref: Pre-Period)      
-1 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
0 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
1 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 
2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
3 0.12* 0.11 0.07 0.02 -0.01 
4 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
5 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 
6 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
7 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 















Female labor force participation and educational attainment have continued to rise over the 
past decades, which led gender attitude scholars to be cautiously optimistic about the future of 
egalitarian attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Yet recent studies are more skeptical, 
demonstrating that gender attitudes are either stalling, (Cotter, et al., 2011) becoming more 
traditional (Pepin and Cotter, 2018), or diverging across sub-dimensions of attitudes (Grunow, et al. 
2018, Knight and Brinton, 2017).  
Over this same period, a growing partisan split in gender attitudes has emerged – Democrats 
are more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes, while Republicans hold relatively more traditional ones. 
In a 2017 Pew Survey, 69% of those who identified as Democrats said the country “hasn’t gone far 
enough” to promote gender equality, while only 26% of Republicans said the same (Horowitz, et al., 
2017). The 2016 presidential election brought this into sharp focus; a number of studies identified 
sexism and/or gender attitudes as playing a role in shaping support for then-candidate Trump 
(Bracic, et al. 2019, Cassese and Holman, 2019, Strolovitch, et al. 2016, Valentino, et al., 2017). But 
Democrats and Republicans have not historically been so divided in their gender attitudes. This 
raises an important question – is partisanship itself driving gender attitudes, or does social sorting 
and partisan realignment mean that those more likely to hold gender egalitarian beliefs find 
themselves identifying as Democrats, and those with more traditional beliefs as Republicans? 
Traditionally, gender attitudes are thought to be the product of a combination of childhood 
socialization and early adult experiences like religiosity, region, and family (Davis and Greenstein, 
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2009, Fan and Marini, 2000, McLanahan and Percheski, 2008, Pepin and Cotter, 2018, Sutfin, et al., 
2008) and contextual factors like feminist mobilization, female workforce participation, and regional 
gender norms (Scarborough and Sin 2020, Shorrocks 2018). Gender attitudes are thought to be less 
closely related to politics than attitudes about policy issues or, in the U.S. context, race (Engelhardt 
2019). 
But there are two reasons why this is an incomplete picture. As demographic bases of parties 
have shifted, the parties have increasingly clarified their positions on gender issues (Costain, 1991, 
Wolbrecht, 2000). The Republican party has been the party of “traditional” values and families, 
while the Democratic party is associated with the feminist movement and more egalitarian gender 
roles in ways that voters do perceive (Winter 2010). Partisanship has become an increasingly central 
attitude and social identity, and plays a much greater force in politics than it once did (Hetherington, 
2001, Mason, 2018). One of the consequences of the increased importance of partisanship is that 
individuals update their preferences and attitudes based on messages they receive from the parties 
on any number of issues (Bartels, 2002, Bolsen et al. 2014, Goren, 2005, Lenz, 2012).  
While partisanship itself shapes gender attitudes in a new era of polarization, I also argue the 
role of the increasing social distinctiveness of the parties facilitates the adoption of more partisan-
consistent gender attitudes. In other words, I argue the role of partisanship on attitudes is 
conditional on the extent to which an individuals’ social characteristics align with their partisan 
identities. Recent work on the effects of social sorting on American politics has found that 
individuals whose social groups align with their partisanship are more likely to express stronger 
levels of partisan identification (Mason and Wronski 2018). In turn, those stronger partisans are 
more likely to adopt their parties’ beliefs, and this is especially true for those active in politics (Lenz 
2012). This has important implications for gender attitudes. As the parties have become more 
socially distinct, the same social groupings that are generally associated with a particular party – like 
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religion, race, and ideological orientation – are also tightly associated with the characteristics 
promoting distinct sets of gender attitudes. The extent to which an individual has more party-aligned 
social characteristics might reinforce both their partisanship and their gender attitudes. 
This paper uses these explanations to better understand why and how partisans increasingly 
hold more distinct sets of gender attitudes. First, I use GSS data from 1977, 1985-2018 to show 
trends in gender attitudes are diverging by partisan identity over time. Partisanship is not a predictor 
of gender attitudes when these questions are first introduced to the GSS in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
partisan identity becomes and remains a strong and substantive predictor of gender attitudes by the 
late 1990s. The effects are asymmetrical; Democrat’s gender attitudes significantly change over time, 
and change among Republicans is smaller. 
The second part of the analysis examines the causal dynamics underpinning the relationship 
between gender attitudes and partisanship. I do this by analyzing the ANES panel from 1992-1994, 
the GSS Panel from 2006 to 2010, and the VOTER panel survey from 2016-2019. These capture 
three snapshots, over the course of which the salience of gender issues for parties and the centrality 
of partisanship to political competition increased. Using cross-lagged regression models previously 
used by Engelhardt (2019), I find evidence that more recently, partisanship becomes a stronger 
predictor of gender attitudes. This suggests that partisans are, on the margins, updating their gender 
beliefs, leading to increasingly distinct sets of gender attitudes on either side of the partisan divide. 
In a next step, I assess whether better-sorted partisans are more likely to update their gender 
attitudes. Using GSS panel data from 2006 to 2008, I explore the role of party-aligned social 
identities on the propensity to have both more coherent and more distinct gender attitudes. I show 
that better-sorted partisans are more likely to adopt distinct and more coherent gender attitude 
profiles. Moreover, I find evidence that across all levels of partisan identification, the effect of 
sorting on gender attitudes is only greater than zero at a higher level of sorting. This is initial 
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evidence that while partisanship plays some role in shaping gender attitudes, there is a more 
powerful effect where individuals’ social identities align with partisanship. 
These diverging trends in gender attitudes shed light on the pressing question of why the 
gender revolution is incomplete, at least in the United States. Gender attitudes, which are thought to 
be the product of micro- and macro-level socialization factors, have become tied to politics as the 
issue has become politicized. As a result, distinct frames around gender have emerged on either side 
of the partisan divide. Specifically, gender scholars have noted the emergence of choice feminist and 
‘egalitarian essentialist’ frames (Crompton and Lyonette 2005, Scarborough et al. 2019) that blend 
egalitarian and traditional elements. Rather than seeing these as stopping points on the road to 
egalitarianism, their relevance and proximity to politics means these are likely enduring features of 
the social landscape. 
Gender Attitude Formation and Change  
Gender attitudes are the multi-dimensional set of beliefs about gendered and separate 
spheres in life (Davis and Greenstein, 2009). Gender attitude formation and change occurs on two 
levels. At the micro-level, gender attitudes are molded by an individual’s family environment (Sutfin 
et al, 2008). As individuals age, their own experiences and peers take on increased importance in 
forming their expectations and outlooks on gender, especially as they make decisions about forming 
households of their own (Davis, 2007). At the macro-level, gender attitudes have been shown to 
change as a result of women’s employment, education, policy context, and societal-level changes 
resulting from (feminist) movements or news media (Bolzendahl and Meyers, 2004, Cotter et al., 
2011, Scarborough and Sin 2020, Shorrocks, 2018). 
More recently, there is evidence that there is some plateauing or reversal in gender attitudes, 
especially among younger Americans (Pepin and Cotter 2018, Dernberger and Pepin 2020). 
Specifically, issues of traditionally gendered roles or ‘essentialist’ beliefs about women’s roles in 
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society have seen stagnation or reversal, while attitudes towards women in the workplace have 
continued to become more egalitarian. In effect, these attitudes reflect expectations of women 
experiencing the second shift – that at least in the United States, changing gender norms about 
women as breadwinners has not come alongside changes in norms about who does what at home 
(Pepin and Cotter 2018).  
At the same time as aggregate trends are changing, there is growing evidence of a partisan 
split in gender role attitudes. To show this, I examine the association between different measures of 
gender attitudes and partisan identity in the pooled General Social Survey. The strength of the 
association grows over time, with more traditional attitudes associated with stronger Republican 
identification, and more egalitarian attitudes associated with stronger Democratic identification (see 
Appendix A). In the 1977 GSS, the correlation is negative and insignificant, rising to 0.10 in the 
1990s and peaking at around 0.27 in 2018. These are surprisingly strong correlations; for context, 
Engelhardt (2019) finds correlations of racial attitudes and partisanship between 0.20 and 0.5. 




Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of partisanship on a three-question gender attitude scale2 in 
two years, 1977, the first year gender attitude these questions were asked, and 2016 (with controls).  
The effect over the range of the seven-point PID is not statistically significant in 1977. Gender 
egalitarians and traditionalists were found in both the Republican and Democratic parties. By 2016, a 
shift from strong Democrat to strong Republican identification is associated with a half a standard 
deviation shift in the gender attitude scale. This serves as initial evidence that gender attitudes are 
associated with party identification, and that this effect has grown stronger over time. 
Partisanship and Updating of Gender Attitudes 
This raises an important question: is the growing gap between partisans on gender attitudes 
and association between attitudes and partisanship driven by the sorting of similarly-minded 
individuals and groups into either party, or is this the result of partisanship-induced attitudinal 
updating? There is some evidence that partisan-induced updating has affected attitudes on race 
(Englehardt (2019)), and the central question explored here is whether the same pattern exists for 
gender attitudes. 
Parties’ messages on gender are subtler than on race. They have an effect though; the 
heightened salience of gender issues in 2016 resulted in a highly sorted public on the basis of their 
gender attitudes and levels of sexism (Cassese and Holman, 2019). Beyond the salience of gender 
issues in a particular electoral cycle, the parties have become more divided over issues of gender, 
including sexual harassment, abortion, and work-family reconciliation policies (Costain, 1991, 
Wolbrecht, 2000). The Republican coalition that includes evangelical Christians has made it the party 
of “traditional family values,” while the Democratic coalition that included successive waves of the 
                                               
2 I also create a scale of gender attitudes created from three questions: “Generally speaking, it is better for a man to work 
and a woman to tend to the home?” “A working mother can have just as warm a relationship with her child as one who 




feminist movement and pro-abortion movement has given it a different gendered image (Freeman 
1993).  
The politicization of issues of gender and sexuality is reflected in the emergence of 
differentiated framings and understandings of feminism and femininity related to either party. The 
Democrats, for example, have championed “women’s issues” over time, including pay gaps, 
workplace harassment, reproductive rights, and social welfare issues (Sharrow et al. 2016). 
Strolovitch et al. (2017) refer to white conservative feminism as distinctly anti-feminist and a 
“possessive investment in heteropatriarchy” (354), which they attribute to the interlocking power 
hierarchies related to whiteness, religion, and gender.  
Voters, importantly, also perceive these differences. Republicans are seen as ‘masculine’ and 
Democrats as ‘feminine’ (Winter, 2010), and employ this language in their party agendas (Roberts 
and Utych 2020). Ondercin (2017) finds that a highly visible change and cue for individuals has been 
the increasing share of Democratic representatives who are women, such that partisans may seek out 
the party that aligned with their (gendered) social identities and (gender) attitudes. Consistent with 
this, other work has shown that voters with higher levels of women’s group consciousness and 
identification with feminism have been important predictors of supporting Democrats (Conover 
1988). Recently, these beliefs about the normative roles of men and women are increasingly 
predictive of support for policies like healthcare (Winter, 2005), support for candidates (Sharrow et 
al. 2016) and voting behavior (Valentino, et al. 2018, Strolovitch et al. 2017).  
Gender attitudes present a tougher case to align with the expanding literature on partisan-
based attitudinal change. Gender attitudes are rooted in family socialization and individuals’ lived 
experiences, through which ‘updating’ happens, and therefore more resistant to change (Davis and 
Greenstein, 2009, Davis, 2007, Sutfin et al., 2008). Moreover, strongest predictors of gender 
attitudes include education and ones’ socialization background, and studies rarely addresses 
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associations between political identities or ideology. As a result, gender attitudes should be more 
resilient than political attitudes on foreign policy and immigration, and the magnitude of change is 
unlikely to be dramatic.  
Increased elite-level polarization, including on issues related to gender, has made apparent 
clear and consistent ideological and positional differences between either party. This, in turn, has 
increased the relevance of partisan identification (vis a vis other ideological or social group 
attachments) to any given political situation or issue. Partisanship (and ideology) have come to be 
understood as the most important identity in politics in the United States today (Azari and 
Hetherington 2016, Bartels 2000, Campbell et al. 1960, Hetherington 2001). This has several of the 
following consequences on political life: individuals are more likely to take political action if they 
identify strongly with the party (Mason et al. 2011) and substantial work has documented the rise of 
negative affect towards the other party (affective polarization) (Iyengar et al. 2019).  
This has sparked a debate as to whether elite level polarization has resulted in greater mass 
polarization in political attitudes (Hetherington 2009). Certainly, partisans are better sorted in their 
attitudes. But there is consistent evidence that partisanship plays some role, if small (Levendusky, 
2009). Individuals are more likely to listen to co-partisans (Zaller 1992). Moreover, as voters take in 
increasingly clear and distinct messages, filter them through partisan-tinted ‘perceptual screens’ and 
are likely to update their political beliefs to be consistent with their party’s messages (Bolsen, et al., 
2014, Harteveld, et al., 2017, Levendusky 2010, 2013). Consistent with Engelhardt’s hypothesis that 
racial attitudes are increasingly driven by partisanship over social sorting, Hypothesis 1 sets a similar 
expectation for gender attitudes: 
Hypothesis 1: In recent years, the role of partisanship in shaping gender attitudes has grown 




Social and Political Identities, Polarization, and Gender Attitudes  
 While the importance of partisanship as a group attachment has grown and parties have 
become more clearly divided on gender issues, its potential to shape gender beliefs is only one part 
of the story. The question remains what kind of partisan is more likely to update their gender 
attitudes to be congruent with that of their partisan affiliation. Building off of work that explores the 
consequences of the remarkable changes in the social profiles of either the Democratic and 
Republican parties, I argue that the effect of partisanship on changes in gender attitudes is 
conditional on the extent to which an individuals’ social group attachments align with that of their 
party, such that those with greater alignment of identities are more likely to update their attitudes, 
while those with less clear alignment experience greater cross-pressures that might moderate the 
effect of partisanship on attitudinal change. 
Group membership in a range of social categories has long been understood to be the basis 
for partisan identification and attitude formation (Campbell et al. 1960). Historically, there was 
greater cross-pressuring of groups and their alignment with politics, which may have moderated the 
potential for polarization (Mason 2016). As partisanship as a group attachment and identity has 
become more important, it has also come into alignment with an individuals’ other social and 
political identities (Mason 2018). As Lilliana Mason argues, “[the sorting] that has occurred during 
the last 50 years has not been a consequences-free realignment of static identities. Sorting, by virtue 
of its basis in social identities, has acted to increase the strength of political identities and has 
polarized mass political behavior (Mason 2015: 128).” More recently, social and political identities 
have become more intertwined and political conflict has been reduced to a single fault line, 
partisanship (Mason 2018). 
Consequently, the previously non- or less political has become eminently political. The social 
distinctiveness of American political parties has increased over time, such that racial, religious, and 
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even urban/rural identities or cleavages are uniquely aligned with either partisan identity. Specifically, 
Republicans tend to be whiter, conservative, and religious, while Democrats trend towards being 
racially diverse, liberal, and secular. This alignment of social identities with partisan ones has been 
associated with stronger partisan attachments (Mason and Wronski 2018). The direction of this 
change is somewhat up for debate, as Egan (2019) finds that the strength of these partisan 
attachments has also been linked to causal changes in individuals’ social identification, such that 
individuals with stronger partisan attachments are more likely to update their non-political identities 
to align with their political ones. 
This has important implications for the study of gender role attitudes. The features of the 
social landscape that shape gender attitudes historically did not also predict partisanship. In recent 
years, the identities and group attachments – especially religious and ideological identities – that are 
associated with particular gender attitudes are now also associated with partisan ones. Religious 
identification is indicative of the socialization background that might have fostered particular gender 
attitudes, but is also associated with contemporary religious affiliations that sustain those attitudes in 
adulthood. Ideological identification as a conservative or liberal similarly is associated with more 
traditional or egalitarian orientations towards gender roles and gendered work-family arrangements.  
What is the relationship between individuals’ social group alignments with partisanship and 
political attitudes? I argue that the alignment of social group attachments with partisanship serves to 
strengthen the relationship between partisanship and gender attitudes. Partisans who are better 
sorted feel fewer cross-pressures on their attitudes and identities (Mason 2016). These also tend to 
be stronger partisans. Stronger partisans, in turn, are more attuned to politics and their parties’ 
messages and more likely to internalize party cues (Lenz 2012). This has the potential to create a 
self-enforcing cycle. Partisanship, especially for those who are well sorted, could serve to ‘sharpen’ 
pre-existing beliefs. This is a matter of degree, but also type. For a multi-dimensional set of attitudes 
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(like gender attitudes), strongly sorted partisans are more likely to hold more consistent beliefs 
across different types of gender attitudes. 
Adding fuel to this fire is that the parties have clarified their stances on gender issues as this 
sorting has taken place. As battles over gender issues have taken on a distinct partisan character, it is 
increasingly clear which parties are in favor of abortion access, concerns over sexual harassment and 
assault, diverse representation, and policies geared towards addressing gender inequalities. Because 
the clarity of partisan messages on issues has been linked with greater attitudinal consistency among 
voters (Levendusky 2009), I also expect this to be true for gender attitudes.  
The expectation is then that better sorted partisans will hold more polarized and consistent 
gender attitudes. But it also allows me to test the relative power of partisanship compared to the role 
of social groups in predicting gender attitudes. If partisanship alone is driving attitudinal changes, 
then we would expect even the less well-sorted individuals to be subjected to attitudinal updating 
and shifts. In fact, the effect on gender attitudes would be uniform across different levels of social 
sorting. By contrast, if social sorting and partisanship reinforce one another, then the effect would 
vary across levels of sorting. Better sorted individuals in this case would be more likely to have 
different sets of gender attitudes because they are more likely to be stronger partisans, be attuned to 
party messages, and incorporate partisan messages into their own attitudes. But less sorted 
individuals, or those whose social groups are cross-pressured vis a vis partisanship, are less likely to 
have strongly polarized gender attitudes. 
Hypothesis 2: Well-sorted partisans are more likely than less well-sorted partisans to hold both more distinct 
and internally consistent gender attitudes. 
Data 
The data for this paper comes from several sources. The first set of empirical analysis uses 
data on gender attitudes and partisanship from three nationally-representative panel surveys. The 
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ANES Panel was run from 1992 to 1994 (N=750). The GSS Panel is a three-wave panel study which 
was run from 2006, 2008, and 2010 (N = 2,000). The third set of data come from the 2016-2019 
VOTER panel survey, first conducted during the presidential campaign of 2016, with subsequent 
waves in 2017 and 2019 (N=8,000). This is done in order to capture different moments in U.S. 
politics with varying importance of partisanship. The dependent variable is party identification 
(seven point, recoded 0-1) and gender attitudes (also scaled to 0-1). The only consistent dependent 
variable across surveys is the question about traditional arrangements. “Generally speaking, it is 
better for a man to work and better for women to tend to the home.” 
The second set of analyses uses only the General Social Survey Panel, which was a three-
wave panel run between 2006 and 2010. I use this panel as opposed to any more recent panel 
because it contains a larger battery of gender attitude questions. It contains the same question about 
traditional roles: “Generally speaking, is it better for a man to work and a woman to tend to the 
home?” This question is available for 1977, 1985, and every wave since then, and is used in the 
analysis that produced Figure 1. But the panel also contains several other questions on gender 
attitudes which I use to create a scale of gender attitudes. The questions included in this scale are: 
“Generally speaking, it is better for a man to work and a woman to tend to the home?” “A working 
mother can have just as warm a relationship with her child as one who does not work (reverse-
coded),” and, “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if the mother works when the child is young” 
(See Appendix). Partisanship is measured on a seven-point scale (Strong Democrat to Strong 
Republican). 
Additionally, the data contain common controls for gender attitudes including: education 
(categorical), age, marital status, gender, region, attention to politics, religious attendance, 




Empirical Analysis: Cross-Lagged Panel Regressions 
I use cross-lagged panel regressions and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) using data 
from the ANES panel, GSS panel, and VOTER panel to unpack the over time change in the 
relationship between party identification and gender attitudes (Finkel, 1995). The goal of cross-
lagged models is to understand why gender attitudes have become more polarized – because gender 
attitudes are leading to later partisan identification, or if partisan identification predicts later gender 
attitudes. I follow Engelhardt’s (2020) approach using several panels to assess the relationship at 
different points in time when both gender issues were more (less) salient to partisan politics, and 
partisanship was more or less central to political life. These capture three different moments in the 
relevance of gender issues to American politics and move from a less partisan centric world of the 
1990s to the “hyper-polarized” world of the late 2010s.  
The cross-lagged models are estimated simultaneously and can be shown mathematically as:  
 
The first model regresses gender attitudes for individual i at time t against their reported 
partisanship at t-1 while controlling for the respondents’ previously reported gender attitudes. The 
second model regresses current partisanship for individual i at time t against their lagged gender 
attitudes at time t-1 while controlling for lagged partisanship.  
This method allows me to examine how much change in one variable (i.e. gender attitudes) 
can be attributed to lagged values of gender attitudes and partisan identification, and conversely how 
much change in partisanship is accounted for by lagged values of both gender attitudes and partisan 
identification. In these equations, b1 and a2 reflect the extent to which lagged partisanship and 
gender attitudes, respectively predict later values of the other construct. b2 and a1 account for the 
stability of each other construct over time, and are lagged values of the dependent variable.  
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There are two things that can be assessed with this model. First, the (lack of) significance of 
the outcomes of interest, b1 and a2, suggest whether or not partisanship predicts gender attitudes 
(b1) or whether gender attitudes predict partisanship (a2). Second, seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) allows coefficients to be compared across the two models, which can shed light on the relative 
explanatory power of partisanship or sorting (gender attitudes). Therefore, third and sixth columns 
in each set of models compares the effects of b1 (partisanship t-1) and a2 (gender attitudest-1). A 
statistically significant difference in coefficients suggests different relative magnitudes of either 
explanatory pathway. If b1 > a2, then this suggests partisanship matters more for gender attitude 
formation. But if the opposite is true, and a2 < b1, then gender attitudes, sorting, and socialization 
are stronger drivers of partisan identification. 
 
Table 3.1: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, ANES Panel 1992-1994 
  All Respondents White Americans 
  Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 0.008 0.858* -0.036 0.011 0.861* -0.0696 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.0487) (0.032) (0.023) (0.048) 
Trad Roles t-1 0.527* 0.054^  0.556* -0.058^  
 (0.043) (0.032)  (0.044) (0.034)  
Constant 0.124 0.070  .131 0.787  
 (0.019) (0.015)  (0.022) (0.017)  
R2 0.269 0.644  0.293 0.67  
Residual Std. 
Error 0.239 0.212  0.233 0.2  
Observations 687 687   580 580   
Note: Data from ANES Panel 1992-1994. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with 
robust standard errors.  
 
Table 1 shows that in the ANES Panel, lagged partisanship was a statistically insignificant 
predictor of gender role attitudes for both a full sample and white Americans. The effect of lagged 
gender attitudes on partisanship is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, weakly suggesting gender 
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attitudes influences later partisan identification. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 1 calculate the differences 
between b1 and a2, comparing the relative strengths of either causal pathway. The differences are 
not significant here, suggesting that in a less partisan-centric world, there is little evidence of a 
relationship between gender attitudes and partisan identification. 
 
Table 3.2: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, GSS Panel 2006-2010 
 
 White Americans All Respondents 
 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles 
t 
PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 -0.0715* 0.760* 0.015 -0.066* 0.782* -0.023 
 (-0.033) (-0.030) (-0.05) (0.029) (0.024) (0.042) 
Trad Roles t-1 0.529* -0.086*  0.482* -0.043  
 (-0.038) (-0.039)  (0.033) (0.031)  
Constant 0.327* 0.174*  0.343* 0.108*  
 (-0.034) (-0.035)  (0.028) (0.025)  
R2 0.33 0.62  0.273 0.61  
Residual Std. 
Error 0.227 0.204 
 0.237 0.212  
Observations 565 565  782 782  
Note: Data from GSS Panel survey 2006-2010. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population 
weights with robust standard errors. 
 
Table 2 shows the GSS Panel nearly a decade and a half later as the process of elite 
polarization has taken place and partisanship has become more relevant to political life. For the first 
time, an individual’s previously reported partisan identification is statistically significantly related to 
an an individual’s later gender attitudes. The difference between the strongest partisans amounts to 
about a third of a category change in the gender attitudes question, which is substantively rather 
small. For white respondents, the effect of sorting is also present; previously reported gender 
attitudes predict later partisan identification. the results look slightly different for all respondents, 




The results in columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 calculate the difference between b1 and a2, which 
intended to compare the relative strengths of either causal pathway. If b1 was greater than a2, this 
would suggest that lagged partisanship has a greater effect on current gender attitudes as compared 
to the effect of lagged gender attitudes on current partisanship. However, these differences are not 
significant. For these data from the 2000s, it does not appear that either pathway holds greater 
explanatory power, yet both are present. 
 
Table 3.3: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Partisanship, VOTER 2016-2019 Data 
 White Americans All Respondents 
 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 -0.115* 0.946* -0.073* -0.125* 0.946* -0.105* 
 (-0.02) (-0.013) -0.023 (0.017) (0.008) (0.02) 
Trad Roles t-1 0.663* -0.042*  0.657* -0.019^  
 (-0.031) (-0.011)  (0.023) (0.010)  
Constant 0.307* 0.068*  0.313 0.047  
 (-0.02) (-0.011)  (0.025) (0.009)  
R2 0.49 0.89  0.49 0.88  
Residual Std. Error 0.223 0.127  0.221 0.122  
Observations 4,634 4,634  5,756 5,756  
Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust 
standard errors. 
 
Table 3 displays the results from the same seemingly unrelated regression models for the 
VOTER panel survey that was conducted between 2016 and 2019, when gender issues were more 
salient, particularly because of the Trump candidacy and #MeToo movement. Importantly, it is a 
snapshot of a time characterized by strong elite polarization and primacy of partisanship. In these 
data, the effect of b1 (partisanshipt-1) on the traditional roles questions is substantively and 
statistically significant, and stronger than in the previous models. Strong partisans, 40% of the 
sample, separate by 0.129 on the gender attitude question, or about a half a category. A similar 
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pattern unfolds for the effect of lagged gender attitudes on partisanship, such that there is an effect 
of sorting for white Americans that fails to pan out for the full sample that includes non-white 
Americans.  
The takeaway from these models, though, is that the difference in the effect size, calculated 
in columns three and six, is significant in the expected direction. The overall effect of lagged 
partisanship driving later gender attitudes is greater than the other way around, such that in this era 
of hyper-polarization, it seems that gender attitudes are more strongly driven by partisan 
identification than the effect of individuals sorting into either party on the basis of their gender 
beliefs.  
The Role of Sorting and Partisanship on Gender Attitude Consistency 
In the previous section, the results from the cross-lagged models indicate that partisanship 
has become a more prominent predictor of gender attitudes. But an open question remains which 
partisans are more likely to adopt these gender attitudes. Bringing together work on the social 
sorting of the American electorate and partisan-biased attitudinal change, I theorized that well-sorted 
partisans were more likely than those whose social group attachments are less aligned with their 
party’s modal groups to express both more consistent and polarized gender attitudes.  Research on 
social sorting has found that partisanship is increasingly associated with a set of social characteristics 
and parties are internally more coherent, and that this alignment of social groupings facilitates 
stronger partisan attachments. But what makes gender attitudes unique vis a vis other political 
attitudes is that those social characteristics that are associated with partisanship are in alignment with 
the social characteristics that promote different sets of gender role attitudes. If that alignment of 
attitudes facilitates partisan attachments, this might carry important consequences for attitudes, as 
another line of work has demonstrated that stronger partisans are more likely to adopt parties’ 
messages (Lenz, 2012, Zaller and Feldman, 1992).  
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This section tests if individuals who are better ‘sorted’ (i.e. their demographics match those 
who ‘belong’ to the party) might be particularly more likely to express more consistent and polarized 
attitudes. If partisanship is doing most of the work, we would expect to see that all partisans, 
regardless of social characteristics, express more consistent and distinct gender attitudes from those 
of the other party. But if the cross-pressuring of social characteristics moderates the relationship to 
attitudinal change, then only the better-sorted partisans will hold both more internally consistent and 
polarized attitudes.   
As a first test of this, I use latent class modeling to examine whether better sorted partisans 
are more likely to express more internally consistent gender attitudes. Latent class analysis is 
particularly useful in the case of gender attitudes, which consist of individuals’ heterogeneous views 
about the roles of men and women in society, tradeoffs regarding career and family, and essentialist 
beliefs about who men and women ‘are’ and what they ‘want.’ While individuals sometimes hold 
different views across these dimensions, better-sorted partisans may express views more consistent 
across sub-dimensions. Latent class analysis searches for response patterns across (related) variables, 
and divides the data into probabilistic clusters where respondents in the same cluster are assumed to 
share some underlying association (Clogg, 1995, Collins and Lazna, 2010, Scarborough, et al. 2019). 
Once the clusters of attitudes are determined, they are regressed on a series of social characteristics 
to understand the predictors of class membership.   
I follow Scarborough et al.’s (2019) approach to latent class modelling of gender attitudes in 
the GSS panel from 2006 to 2010. The analysis was done with the questions in Table 3.12 in the 
appendix that tap into essentialist beliefs, beliefs about working mothers, questions about women in 
the public sphere, and a rare question about men’s behavior. These are consistent with how other 
work has categorized gender attitudes and used them in latent class analysis (Ciabattari, 2001, 
Donnelly, Twenge, and Clark, 2015, Knight and Brinton, 2018, Scarborough et al, 2019). The best 
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fitting LCA model was selected primarily on lowest BIC values, but also log likelihood, separation of 
the classes, in addition to theory and substantive meaning (Collins and Lanza, 2010). 
The best fitting LCA was a model with five ‘classes,’ or ways in which individuals combined 
responses to a variety of gender attitude questions. They are: Strong Egalitarians (17%), Egalitarians 
(37%), Ambivalents (15%), Traditionalists (24%), and Strong Traditionalists (7%). Strong 
Egalitarians express the most consistent set of egalitarian beliefs across all dimensions, while strong 
traditionalists do the same for traditional attitudes. Egalitarians and Traditionalists are differentiated 
from Strong Egalitarians/Traditionalists in that they either hold more mixed attitudes across sub-
dimensions and slightly less egalitarian/traditional beliefs. Individuals who responded in the most 
heterogenous ways were grouped into the ‘Ambivalents’ category. Table 3.12 in the appendix shows 
conditional response probabilities for all questions. 
The next step is to analyze class membership. I use multinomial logits to identify 
associations between class membership (the five categories listed above) and socio-structural and 
political characteristics, with standard errors clustered at the person level for the full GSS panel 
sample (2006-2010). Following the Mason and Wronski (2018), I create a measure to assess the 
degree to which individuals match their parties’ social and ideological profile. White, religious 
individuals, and self-identified conservatives are put into a scale ranging from 0-1, where one 
indicates perfectly sorted individuals and zero indicates the least well-sorted Republicans. Minorities, 
secular individuals, and liberals are used to create a similar variable for ‘objective Democrats.’ In 
general, Republicans are better sorted than their Democratic counterparts, which is not surprising 
given that the Democrats can be seen as a party of multiple (racial and ethnic) coalitions, while the 
Republican party is more homogenous (Mason 2018).  
The results (Appendix Tables 3.13-3.15) indicate that better levels of sorting are associated 
with belonging to one of the more ‘extreme’ classes of Strong Egalitarians or Traditionalists, relative 
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to the likelihood of belonging to the middling “Ambivalent” group. Being a better-sorted 
Republican is associated with an increased probability of holding more consistently traditional 
gender beliefs; they are more likely than those who hold ambivalent beliefs to be traditionalists and 
strong traditionalists. Moreover, greater levels sorting (at the individual level) is associated with a 
lower probability of holding egalitarian attitudes. The same is true for white, but not all, Democrats; 
well-sorted white Democrats are more likely to hold egalitarian or strong egalitarian gender attitudes, 
and significantly less likely to hold very traditional beliefs (reference category: Ambivalent attitudes). 
Lastly, I test the proposition that the degree of social alignment with the party and 
partisanship combined lead to more polarized sets of gender attitudes.  To test this, I return to 
leveraging the panel structure of the data to see if the effect of partisanship on gender attitudes is 
conditional on the extent to which individuals’ social characteristics are in alignment with that of 
their party. I use fixed effects OLS regression models regressing the gender attitude scale on the 
interaction of partisanship (Democrat or Republican binary) and the social alignment variable, with 
controls for religious attendance, income, and number of children (see Appendix Table 3.17-3.18). I 
also run an alternative specification that interacts a 7-point partisanship scale with the social 
alignment variable.  
In both cases, the interaction of partisanship and social sorting is significant. Better sorted 
partisans, conditional on party identification, are likely to have more polarized gender attitudes. The 
best sorted Republicans (Democrats) have more traditional (egalitarian) gender attitudes than the 
least-sorted Republicans (Democrats). Figure 1 shows the predicted values of gender attitudes that 







Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects Plot, Sorting on Gender Attitudes 
 
Note: The plot shows the predicted values of the gender attitudes scale for Republicans and Democrats at different 
levels of the measure of social sorting. The regression model, including controls for income, work status, number of 
children, political awareness, age, and panel identifiers can be found in the Appendix Table 3.16, Model 1. 
 
At the lowest levels of social alignment to partisanship, the difference between Democrats’ 
and Republicans’ gender attitudes is not statistically significant. But at higher levels of sorting, these 
differences become statistically significant. The difference is equivalent to slightly more than a 
standard deviation difference in the gender attitudes scale. 
One possibility is that less sorted individuals belong to a variety of social groups that result 
in more heterogeneous gender attitudes. Another possibility is that the extent of social sorting is 
merely a proxy for the strength of partisan attachments, such that weaker identifiers, those who are 
least likely to receive and internalize their party’s messages on gender issues, are simultaneously 
those who belong to social groups with competing partisan affiliations. To test whether the effects 
hold at particular levels of sorting or asymmetrically across the strength of partisan identification, I 
run an alternative model with a 7-point partisanship scale. The results suggest that the marginal 
effects of partisan-aligned identities are statistically significant across nearly every level of partisan 
identification. Worth noting is that within each category, the effects of sorting are statistically 
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insignificant at low levels of sorting (<0.5), and only statistically significant for those with higher 
congruence of identities and partisanship. This suggests that even a distant connection to the party, 
when combined with partisan-aligned social groupings, can strengthen the association between party 
and attitude. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article addresses the recognition among scholars of gender attitudes that the path 
towards egalitarian attitudes is not as straightforward as it once seemed. Many scholars have 
identified either reversals in gender egalitarianism, but recently much attention has shifted to 
understanding the heterogeneous beliefs individuals hold (Grunow, et al., 2017, Knight and Brinton, 
2018, Pepin and Cotter, 2018). In particular, Dernberger and Pepin (2020) find significant support 
for more traditional arrangements among young men and women, while Shorrocks (2018) finds 
significant support for more gender essentialist beliefs among younger generations. Part of what 
might be underlying these changing patterns of gender attitudes is how social characteristics and 
party alignment have come to reinforce one another, especially in contexts where issues around 
gender are made politically salient.  
Over the last half-century, parties have taken clearer stances on gender issues while at the 
same time their electoral bases have become more socially distinct. I first demonstrated that 
partisans have become polarized on their gender attitudes. While traditional attitudes were more 
common in the 1980s, party did not separate gender egalitarians from gender traditionalists. While 
neither party is expressing more conservative attitudes than previously, their gender attitudes have 
drifted apart. But what is the driver of the relationship between gender attitudes and partisanship? 
Party polarization on gender issues could be related to gender attitudes because individuals 
internalize and then espouse their parties’ gender attitudes. On the other hand, it could instead 
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reflect the fact that certain social groups that promote different gender attitudes have better sorted 
themselves into opposing parties.  
The results from the cross-lagged models first suggest that the effect size of both 
partisanship on gender attitudes increases over the course of two decades of panel data. Partisans 
update their gender attitudes, particularly in recent years, where the effect of partisanship on 
attitudes eclipses the effect of gender attitudes on partisan identification. 
However, scholarship should be cautious of making claims that greater identification with a 
party singularly leads individuals to align their attitudes with those of the party. This is especially true 
of gender attitudes, which are thought to be formed as a result of personal experiences and 
socialization. Those socialization factors as they relate to gender attitudes are today in alignment 
with the same factors promoting partisan attachments because of the social sorting that has 
occurred. Bridging theories of partisan induced attitudinal changes with theories of social sorting 
suggests that if partisans hold socially aligned characteristics with that of their party, they are more 
likely to adopt attitudes consistent with that party and hold more consistent and polarized beliefs, as 
results from the latent class analysis and panel analysis show. 
The implication of this work is that the process of social change and its alignment with party 
politics has had important consequences for ostensibly non-political attitudes. Partisanship, 
especially when combined with strong social ties to a particular party, has the potential to result in 
more polarized gender attitudes. Because of the relationship between partisanship and social 
identities, this has the potential to be a self-enforcing cycle (Egan 2020). Part of the question of what 
is happening to gender attitudes in the United States, then, also has to do with partisanship, net of all 
other factors. 
One particular question that arose during the 2016 election cycle is why white women broke 
in favor of Trump, seeming to defy expectations about how his overtly sexist remarks would be 
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received by them. This comports with and expands on recent work showing conservative and liberal 
women have fundamentally different understandings of womanhood that align with their partisan 
identities (McCall and Orloff, 2017). Social divides and partisanship reinforce each other, 
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Figure A1: Theoretical Model 
 
 
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics, GSS Data 1977-2018 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Traditional Roles 30075 0.57136 0.2282628 0 1 
Gender Attitude Scale 24368 0 1 -2.50956 1.8683 
Women’s Share Inc. 26919 0.303841 0.3211483 0 1 
Household Type 38020 3.78485 2.08924 1 7 
Sex 53695 1.572083 0.4947814 1 2 
Year 53695 1994.498 13.42971 1972 2018 
Age 53502 42.54276 14.7375 18 89 
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Democrat 32390 0.5919111 0.4914873 0 1 
Party ID 52469 0.444798 0.330987 0 1 
HH Incom 53695 30436.51 30021.58 0 162607 
Religious Attend 53213 3.718246 2.699907 0 8 
Education 53565 1.400989 1.171996 0 4 
Mother's Education 47346 0.8876146 0.9949603 0 4 
Region 53695 4.3632 2.580737 0 9 
Race 53695 1.262967 0.5587426 1 3 
Children 53695 0.7280939 0.4449459 0 1 
Marital Status 53674 2.314957 1.644367 1 5 
Subjective Class 50782 2.427671 0.6496494 1 4 
 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics, ANES Panel Survey 1992-1994 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Traditional Roles 1413 0.208 0.280 0 1 
Party ID 1467 0.513 0.338 0 1 
 
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics, GSS Panel Survey 2006-2010 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Party ID 4694 0.457 0.334 0 1 
Traditional Roles 3118 0.585 0.282 0 1 
Gender Attitude Scale 3152 0.585 0.099 0 1 
Objective Sorting 4667 0.554 0.262 0 1 
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics, VOTER Panel Survey 2016-2019 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Traditional Roles 14603 0.7844 0.289 0 1 
Party ID 14677 0.4636 0.369 0 1 













Figure 3.4: Correlation Between Traditional Roles Question and PID in GSS Data 
 
   Note: GSS Data 1977, 1985-2018 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Correlation Between Gender Attitudes Scale and PID in GSS Data 
 
 
  Note: GSS Data 1977, 1985-2018 
 
The gender attitude scales were constructed through principal component factor analysis, 
using varmax rotation for the gender attitude scale. The goal of creating scales is to improve scale 
reliability and leverage greater variation in different question responses. The gender attitude scale in 
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the GSS Panel is constructed with three questions that provide the greatest coverage in terms of years 
available: 1977, 1985, and every GSS wave thereafter. They are, “Generally speaking, it is better if the 
man works and a woman tends to the home,” “A preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother 
works,” and, “A working mother can have as warm a relationship with her child, as one who does not 
work.” The following is the output from the scale construction model:  
 





Preschool child 0.841 
Traditional Roles 0.788 
Note: Eigenvalue for first factor is 1.96; no other factor meets the conventional standard of > 1. 
 
 













Preschool child 0.850 
Traditional Roles 0.796 
Note: Eigenvalue for first factor is 2.02; no other factor meets the conventional standard of > 1. 
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The tradeoff of using a scale like this is that it assumes the scale is one-dimensional. The 
questions “Working Mother” and “Preschool child” are often grouped together as questions about 
the consequences of mothers in the workforce, taken for granted they are in the workforce (Ciabattari, 
2001). The traditional roles question belongs to a category of its own, as it asks about traditional and 
essentialist visions of gendered roles and spheres (Davis and Greenstein, 2009, Donnelly, Twenge, 
and Clark, 2015). Responses to these questions have elsewhere been shown to diverge (Grunow et al., 
2017, Knight and Brinton, 2018, Scarborough et al., 2016). I address the issue of multi-dimensionality 
in much greater depth in the latent class analysis.  
 
The following plots show the distribution of the dependent variables by survey and year. The 
first set of plots are for the only question with continuous measures in the panel data – a question 
about traditional roles for women in society. The second set of plots are for a gender attitude scale 
and a sexism scale, constructed from three questions, (Preschool child, working mothers, and 
including the traditional role question). See Table 3.8 for scale construction.  
 














Figure 3.7: Traditional Roles Question, GSS Panel, 2006 
 
 











Figure 3.9: Traditional Roles Question, VOTER Study, 2016 
 
 
Table 3.9: Alternative Specification for GSS Panel, All Respondents 
Alternative Specifications with All Respondents, 2006-2010 
 Gender Attitude Scale Traditional Roles  
  Gender Att t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 -0.0439* 0.782* 0.0627 -0.0656* 0.782* -0.023 
 (0.0142) (0.0236) (0.0932) (0.0291) (0.0243) (0.0416) 
Gender Att t-1 0.673* -0.107     
 (0.0549) (0.0925)     
Trad Roles t-1    0.482* -0.0426  
    (0.0325) (0.0312)  
Constant 0.252 0.144  0.343 0.108  
 (0.0345) (0.0587)  (0.0277) (0.0252)  
R2 0.27 0.613  0.273 0.61  
Residual Std. Error 0.115 0.21  0.237 0.212  
Observations 803 803  782 782  
Note: Data from GSS panel 2006-2010. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights with robust 
standard errors.  
 
Description of Table 3.9: The table replicates the cross-lagged regression results for all 
respondents (as compared to only white respondents) with data from the GSS panel from 2006 to 
2010. The results demonstrate that lagged partisanship plays a relatively weak role in shaping future 
gender attitudes in both specifications (Columns 1 & 4). The results for social sorting are not 
statistically significant; lagged gender attitudes do not predict partisanship in later waves. This suggests 
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that the addition of non-white and Latinx individuals causes this to be statistically insignificant, 
attesting to the idea that at least at this time, social sorting mechanisms might work differently for 
non-white and Latinx Americans. Note also that the model fit statistics are considerably lower than in 
the paper. This is a strong case to better theorize and consider how race/ethnicity alters the dynamics 
often assumed to be at play for white Americans. 
 
Table 3.10: Alternative Specifications for VOTER Panel 
  2016-2018 Comparison 2018-2019 Comparison 
  
Trad Roles 
t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 -.131* 0.938* -0.10* -0.118* 0.993* -0.109* 
 (0.02) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) (0.005) (0.025) 
Trad Roles t-1 0.667* -0.031*  0.069* -0.009  
 (0.024) (0.013)  (0.0283) (0.007)  
Constant 0.31 0.061  0.276 0.016  
 (0.026) (0.013)  (0.033) (0.008)  
R2 0.53 0.92  0.54 0.94  
Residual Std. Error 0.209 0.102  0.212 0.085  
Observations 2,902 2,902   2,905 2,905   
Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights 
with robust standard errors.  
 
Table 3.11: VOTER Panel by Political Interest, White Americans 
White Americans by Political Interest 
  High Political Interest Low Political Interest 
  Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 Trad Roles t PID t β1-82 
PID t-1 -.129* 0.957* -0.087* -0.095* 0.923* -0.049 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.022) (0.04) (0.02) (0.050) 
Trad Roles t-1 0.660* -0.041*  0.657* -0.047*  
 (0.032) (0.011)  (0.049) (0.021)  
Constant 0.323 0.067  0.287 0.073  
 (0.033) (0.012)  (0.056) (0.022)  
R2 0.53 0.91  0.45 0.85  
Residual Std. Error 0.209 0.115  0.243 0.144  
Observations 3,170 3,170   1,464 1,464   
Note: Data from VOTER survey 2016-2019. Significance * = 0.05, ^ = 0.10. Analysis uses population weights 






Table 3.12: Conditional Response Probabilities for LCA Model 
Response Probabilities 
It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the 
home and the woman takes care of the home and family. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Egalitarians 0.0041 0.1875 0.6837 0.1247  
Ambivalents 0 0 0.8446 0.1554  
Strong Egal. 0.0232 0.0383 0.2291 0.7094  
Most Trad. 0.4798 0.283 0.1662 0.071  
Trad. 0.1154 0.6838 0.2008 0  
      
A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Egalitarians 0 0.0044 0.9634 0.0321  
Ambivalents 0.0395 0.4696 0.4909 0  
Strong Egal. 0.0091 0.0539 0.3164 0.6206  
Most Trad. 0.65 0.2505 0.0742 0.0254  
Trad. 0.0261 0.7105 0.2588 0.0046  
      
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her 
children as a mother who does not work. 
 Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Egalitarians 0.0072 0.0174 0.7594 0.2159  
Ambivalents 0.0021 0.457 0.4665 0.0744  
Strong Egal. 0.0113 0.0096 0.1254 0.8537  
Most Trad. 0.4594 0.3145 0.115 0.1111  
Trad. 0.0385 0.5693 0.3279 0.0642  
      
Men Hurt Their Families When They Focus on Work Too Much  
 Strongly Agree Agree Neither/Nor Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Egalitarians 0.0407 0.4017 0.1798 0.374 0.0039 
Ambivalents 0.0627 0.628 0.095 0.202 0.0123 
Strong Egal. 0.0984 0.3439 0.159 0.2834 0.1152 
Most Trad. 0.3177 0.4425 0.0729 0.1256 0.0413 
Trad. 0.1034 0.5813 0.0994 0.2151 0.0008 
      
Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women. 
 Agree Disagree    
Egalitarians 0.1855 0.8145    
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Ambivalents 0.0936 0.9064    
Strong Egal. 0.0845 0.9155    
Most Trad. 0.3692 0.6308    
Trad. 0.4447 0.5553      
 
Figure 3.10: Model Fit Statistics for LCA 
 
 
Table 3.13: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, All Respondents 
All Respondents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Most Egal Egal Ambiv Trad Most Trad 
            
Objective Democrat (0-1) 1.016 0.364  -0.154 -1.994 
 (0.665) (0.576)  (0.671) (1.278) 
Party Identification -0.356*** -0.107  -0.0465 0.0255 
 (0.0986) (0.0840)  (0.0919) (0.159) 
Sex 0.963*** 0.423**  -0.0674 0.674** 
 (0.238) (0.198)  (0.216) (0.342) 
Religious Attendance 0.0209 -0.0170  0.0730* 0.0351 
 (0.0448) (0.0386)  (0.0419) (0.0710) 
Education 0.329*** 0.177**  -0.190* -0.386* 
 (0.107) (0.0894)  (0.107) (0.228) 
Mother Degree -0.0559 -0.0948  0.00877 -0.562** 
 (0.123) (0.0957)  (0.104) (0.226) 
Working (0/1) 0.212 0.231  -0.270 0.0763 
 (0.234) (0.198)  (0.225) (0.330) 
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Income (0-1) -0.0903 -0.0817  -0.358*** -0.0928 
 (0.118) (0.0993)  (0.135) (0.230) 
Age 0.00119 -0.00474  -0.0139* 0.00449 
 (0.00891) (0.00726)  (0.00800) (0.0138) 
Children 0.0937 0.0672  0.0476 0.174 
 (0.0856) (0.0709)  (0.0759) (0.115) 
Widowed (ref: married) -0.00949 0.0298  -0.0422 -0.0429 
 (0.524) (0.446)  (0.481) (0.782) 
Divorced (ref: married) 0.682** 0.617**  0.208 0.693 
 (0.312) (0.280)  (0.302) (0.487) 
Separated (ref: married) -0.445 0.128  -0.833* 0.209 
 (0.538) (0.430)  (0.488) (0.557) 
Single (ref: married) 0.532 0.441  -0.0932 0.646 
 (0.323) (0.269)  (0.291) (0.513) 
Reginal Indicators Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant -7.781 -9.014  24.11** 2.572 
 (11.19) (11.63)  (10.45) (17.30) 
      
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310 2,310 2,310 
Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.14: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, White Respondents 
 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES 
Most 
Egal Egal Ambiv Trad 
Most 
Trad 
            
Objective Democrat (0-1) 2.022*** 1.378***  0.312 -2.255* 
 (0.638) (0.524)  (0.638) (1.366) 
Party Identification -0.0759 -0.0238  0.115** 0.213*** 
 (0.0542) (0.0428)  (0.0464) (0.0753) 
Sex 1.610*** 0.626***  0.289 0.215 
 (0.222) (0.175)  (0.190) (0.276) 
Religious Attendance 0.0946** 0.0518  0.163*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0350)  (0.0367) (0.0546) 
Education 0.181* -0.000297  -0.244*** -0.155 
 (0.0980) (0.0766)  (0.0827) (0.144) 
Mother Degree 0.00718 -0.0977  0.0362 -0.337** 
 (0.107) (0.0805)  (0.0832) (0.158) 
Working (0/1) 0.398* 0.266  -0.0735 0.0805 
 (0.219) (0.183)  (0.194) (0.304) 
Income (0-1) 0.111 -0.00488  -0.281*** -0.338* 
 (0.0953) (0.0827)  (0.101) (0.197) 
Age -0.00342 -0.00540  -0.0161** -0.00553 
 
 124 
 (0.00851) (0.00680)  (0.00729) (0.0119) 
Children 0.0409 0.00125  0.0380 0.174* 
 (0.0789) (0.0671)  (0.0655) (0.0984) 
Widowed (ref: married) 0.0786 0.0285  -0.220 -0.417 
 (0.517) (0.418)  (0.435) (0.624) 
Divorced (ref: married) 0.905*** 0.404  0.0633 0.230 
 (0.295) (0.260)  (0.274) (0.409) 
Separated (ref: married) 0.551 0.267  -0.331 0.710 
 (0.573) (0.542)  (0.584) (0.672) 
Single (ref: married) 0.365 -0.0560  -0.243 0.156 
 (0.314) (0.257)  (0.277) (0.490) 
Reginal Indicators Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant 1.390 8.702  31.50** 9.544 
 (16.58) (13.27)  (14.20) (23.31) 
      
Observations 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 1,805 
Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Table 3.15: Predicting Class Membership Using Objective Sorting, All Respondents 
Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Most Egal Egal Ambiv Trad Most Trad 
      
Objective Republican (0-1) -0.842** -0.189  0.263 1.204** 
 (0.392) (0.361)  (0.375) (0.561) 
Party Identification -0.0560 -0.00805  0.108*** 0.178*** 
 (0.0479) (0.0387)  (0.0409) (0.0591) 
Sex 1.405*** 0.571***  0.180 0.189 
 (0.195) (0.155)  (0.168) (0.232) 
Religious Attendance 0.0384 0.00686  0.114*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0288)  (0.0308) (0.0466) 
Education 0.188** 0.0342  -0.208*** -0.216* 
 (0.0857) (0.0687)  (0.0740) (0.126) 
Mother Degree 0.0290 -0.0688  0.0350 -0.335** 
 (0.0945) (0.0730)  (0.0755) (0.139) 
Working (0/1) 0.255 0.139  -0.196 0.0141 
 (0.192) (0.163)  (0.175) (0.247) 
Income (0-1) 0.0152 -0.00709  -0.330*** -0.233 
 (0.0895) (0.0749)  (0.0926) (0.159) 
Age -0.00340 -0.00466  -0.0163** -0.00628 
 (0.00723) (0.00594)  (0.00639) (0.00945) 
Children 0.0204 -0.00657  0.00589 0.149* 
 (0.0678) (0.0575)  (0.0571) (0.0799) 
Widowed (ref: married) -0.0222 0.122  -0.0780 -0.485 
 (0.464) (0.389)  (0.401) (0.580) 
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Divorced (ref: married) 0.687*** 0.486**  0.0159 0.257 
 (0.261) (0.229)  (0.247) (0.353) 
Separated (ref: married) -0.427 -0.0124  -0.960** -0.114 
 (0.494) (0.380)  (0.435) (0.498) 
Single (ref: married) 0.340 0.121  -0.256 0.391 
 (0.274) (0.226)  (0.240) (0.365) 
Reginal Indicators _ _  _ _ 
Constant 3.331 8.135  32.33*** 10.33 
 (14.19) (11.64)  (12.51) (18.52) 
      
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310 2,310 2,310 
Standard errors clustered at person level in parentheses 




Table 3.16: Panel Regressions Predicting Gender Attitudes Using Sorting Measures, All Respondents 
 (1) (2) (3) 





    
Party Identity -0.561** -2.700** 3.219** 
 (-0.237) (1.282) (1.461) 
Objective Sorting -0.552** -2.694** 1.860 
 (-0.269) (1.336) (1.404) 
Party Identity * Objective 
Sorting 1.624*** 5.517** -6.779** 
 (-0.501) (2.697) (3.422) 
Fundamentalist Christian -0.0247 0.214 0.0572 
 (-0.0578) (0.263) (0.289) 
Reads Newspaper -0.0337 -0.172 0.185 
 (-0.0238) (0.114) (0.117) 
Age 0.0277* 0.218 -0.271 
 (-0.0161) (0.199) (0.349) 
Income (0-1) -0.00166 -0.156 -0.292 
 (-0.0368) (0.194) (0.297) 
Children 0.0251 0.202 -0.130 
 (-0.0457) (0.230) (0.213) 
Work Status -0.0565 0.273 -0.249 
 (-0.071) (0.326) (0.365) 
Panel Indicators ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Constant -0.886 - - 
 -0.798 - - 
Observations 1,542 470 390 
Number of idnum 770 175 146 
R-squared 0.023 - - 
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Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models 2 and 3 are 
logistic models; because the coefficients are reported as odds ratios, interpretation from 




Table 3.17: Sorting Measure in Interaction with Partisan Strength 
 
Gender Attitudes Scale 
Party ID (Baseline: Strong Dem)  
Not Strong Dem 0.013 
 (0.220) 
Independent, Near Dem -0.167 
 (0.168) 
Independent, Near Rep 0.625** 
 (0.304) 
Not Strong Rep 0.321 
 (0.309) 
Strong Rep 0.575** 
 (0.347) 
Party-Identity Alignment 0.848* 
 (0.484) 
Party ID x Identity Alignment  
  
Not Strong Dem 0.088 
 (0.552) 




Independent, Near Rep -1.589** 
 (0.614) 
Not Strong Rep -1.133* 
 (0.604) 
Strong Rep -1.281** 
 (0.622) 
Religious Attendance 0.003 
 (0.149) 












Panel Indicators Yes 
Constant -1.315 
Obs 1846 




Table 3.18: Marginal Effects of Sorting on Partisan Strength 
Marginal Effects of Sorting by Party Identification 
Party Identification Dy/Dx p-value 
Strong Democrat 1.053235 0.03 
Not Strong Democrat 1.035329 0.034 
Lean Democrat 1.000479 0.058 
Lean Republican -0.8191373 0.018 
Not Strong Republican -0.4285127 0.187 
Strong Republican -0.5987793 0.097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
